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Contractual Limitations on Attorney
Malpractice Liability: An Economic
Approach
By LEONARD E. GRoss*
INTRODUCTION
Many studies have considered the problem of increased lia-
bility insurance premiums and their effect on user fees in various
industries.' Attorneys have not been exempt from such increases,
caused in part by the rise in malpractice claims. 2 Among the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University, School of Law; B.A.,
S.U.N.Y. Binghamton, 1973; J.D., Boston University, 1976. I would like to thank my
colleague, Professor Mark R. Lee, for his many valuable comments and suggestions. I
appreciate the excellent work of my research assistants, Grant Price and Susan Flanagan.
Also, I would like to thank my wife, Robin Gross, for her editorial assistance.
See, e.g., Are Insurers Caught in a Squeeze or Putting It On?, N.Y. Times,
May 25, 1986, § 4, at 18; Strasser, The Tort Crisis: One State's Quest for "Reform,"
Nat'l. L.J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Business Struggling to Adapt as Insurance Crisis
Spreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31, col. 1. One recent study found that the
medical malpractice insurance "crisis" has been caused by two major factors: (1) an
increase in the frequency of claims, and (2) a tremendous increase in the average size of
damage awards, particularly in the size of the largest damage awards. Kelley & Beyler,
Large Damage Awards and the Insurance Crisis: Causes, Effects and Cures, 75 ILL. B.J.
140 (1986). Others contend that the cause of the insurance crisis is mismanagement
within the insurance industry. See, e.g., Hunter & Borzilleri, The Liability Insurance
Crisis, TRIA, Apr. 1986, at 42; Nichols, The Manufacturing of a Crisis, NATION, Feb.
15, 1986, at 173; Rauter, Report Says Litigation Explosion is a "Myth", Nat'l. L.J.,
Apr. 28, 1986, at 46, col. 1; Karr, FTC Investigated Insurance Firms for Price Fixing,
Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1986, at 23, col. 1. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject,
see REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON TE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAI.ABIUTY AND AFFORDABIUTY
(Feb. 1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE TORT PoLcY WORKING GROUP].
2 See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 207 (1986); Suing Lawyers, 72 A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 25; Callanan, Firms Should Examine Insurance Options, Nat'l L.J.,
June 9, 1986, at 14, col. 1 ("according to insurers nationwide, 8% of all lawyers are
now defendants in malpractice cases"); Waldman, Lawyers Adopt New Strategies to
Avoid Suits, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 27, col. 3; Galante, Insurance Costs Soar;
Is There Any Way Out, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Insurance Crisis Hits
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solutions that have been proposed,3 permitting attorney/client
agreements that prospectively limit attorney malpractice liability
merits strong consideration.
Until recently, no cases or statutes addressed whether lawyers
could limit their malpractice liability contractually.4 Prior to the
California Bars, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 5, col. 1; Malpractice, Tort Reform
Focuses on Bar Leaders [New York] State Bar News, Oct. 1985, at 1, col. 1. According
to questionnaire responses from Wisconsin State Bar members, 85% of attorneys prac-
ticing full time, aside from government attorneys and attorneys in legal departments of
corporations, carry legal malpractice insurance. See Schneyer, Mandatory Malpractice
Insurance for Lawyers in Wisconsin and Elsewhere, 1979 Wis. L. R-v. 1019, 1030-31.
1 Other possible "solutions" include limiting awards of punitive damages, capping
attorneys' fees, limiting the scope of joint and several liability to make defendants'
liability more closely correspond to their degree of fault, and placing a ceiling on
noneconomic damages and on overall awards. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S5448-53 (daily
ed. May 7, 1986) (statement of Sen. McConnell); 131 CONG. Rac. S18321 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1985) (Sen. Danforth introduced a bill to provide a uniform product liability
law); Federal Incentives for State Health Care Professional Liability Reform, S1804,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S14356-59 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1985); Limit
Damage Suits? Reagan Enlists in Liability Wars, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Apr.
14, 1986, at 6; Barron, 40 Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times,
July 14, 1986, at 1, col. 1 ("To reduce widespread difficulties in the liability insurance
market, legislatures in more than 40 states passed a variety of new laws before adjourning
for the [1986] summer."); Schmalz, New York Accord Set on Liability Insurance, N.Y.
Times, June 20, 1986, at 12, col. 1 (under the New York bill, parties can only be held
liable for pain and suffering if they have been found responsible for at least 51% of
the injured party's pain and suffering; the collateral source rule has been eliminated in
tort cases; jurors have discretion to make awards of more than $250,000 payable over
a period up to 10 years; and the insurance superintendent establishes annual rates for
how much insurers can raise or lower rates); Changing Laws on Handling of Liability
Claims, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 49, col. I (outline of state liability reform laws);
Pasztor, Reagan Said to Find Senate Sponsor for Bill to Alter Product-Liability System,
Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1986, at 16, col. 2; Kristof, Insurance Woes Spur Many States to
Amend Law on Liability Suits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1986, at Al, col. 2. For criticism
of legislation capping awards, see R. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 158-59 (2d
ed. 1977). Limiting the size of recovery in malpractice cases simply may have the effect
of reducing training (for example, fewer L.L.M. degrees) or the time spent performing
the requested service because there will be less incentive to avoid civil malpractice. Cf.
Reder, An Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 290-91
(1976). Problems of economic efficiency arise because such a limitation is not negotiated
individually between attorney and client but is the subject of uniform regulation. Such
a limitation will make it more difficult for some clients to obtain the type of service
they want even if they are willing to pay for it.
4 The absence of cases and codifications of professional responsibility restricting
attorneys from limiting their malpractice liability has at least two likely explanations.
First, one might infer that provisions limiting attorney malpractice liablity were consid-
ered permissible. Alternatively, it is conceivable that, for whatever reason, attorneys
were not asking their clients to agree to such limitations. Hence, no cases arose and
there was no need to address the issue in a codification of legal ethics.
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code),- promulgated
by the American Bar Association in 1969, no codification of the
standards of legal ethics attempted to restrict an attorney's abil-
ity to limit malpractice liability contractually. 6 Disciplinary Rule
6-102(A) of the Code states: "A lawyer shall not attempt to
exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his
personal malpractice." 7 When the ABA adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in 1983,8 the restriction
continued. ABA Model Rule 1.8(h) 9 effectively prevents attor-
neys from contracting with clients to limit their malpractice
liability prospectively. The first clause of Model Rule 1.8(h)
forbids attorneys from making agreements with clients to limit
potential malpractice liability "unless permitted by law and the
client is independently represented in making the agree-
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmninY (1981) [hereinafter CODE].
See D. HoFrmAN, Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional De-
portment, in A COURsE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836), reprinted in H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETmCS, app. 338-51 (1953); CODE OF ETHIcs OF THE ALARAmA STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION 118Ala.XXiii (1899), reprinted in T. SHAPFER, AmUcAN LEGAL Enucs: TEXT,
READINGS AND DISCUSSION ToPIcs app. I, 30-39 (1985); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHiCS
(1908), reprinted in R. VISE, LEGAL ETmcs app. 421-38 (2d ed. 1970).
1 CODE DR 6-102(A). The rationale for this rule is explained in Ethical Consid-
eration 6-6 as follows: "A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no
need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not
handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do so." Id. at EC
6-6.
. ODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. As
of August, 1986, a version of the Model Rules has been adopted in the following states:
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina and
Washington. In addition, Oregon and Virginia amended their versions of the Model
Code to incorporate the substance of some of the Model Rules. Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 01:3 (1986).
9 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.8(h). Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada and Washington have adopted Model
Rule 1.8(h). Telephone interview with Elaine Reich, ABA (June 24 and Aug. 25, 1986).
New Jersey has adopted Rule 1.8(h) but has added the following additional conditions
regarding when an attorney can limit his malpractice liability prospectively: "(1) the
client fails to act in accordance with the lawyer's advice or refuses to permit the lawyer
to act in accordance with the lawyer's advice and (2) the lawyer nevertheless continues
to represent the client at the client's request." NEw JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1984). In addition, North Carolina adopted Model Rule 1.8(h),
changing only the latter portion of 1.8(h) to make settlement of undisputed claims
outside the scope of the rule. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BAR Rule 5.8 (1986).
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ment.... "1o Professors Hazard and Hodes have suggested that
this portion of Model Rule 1.8(h) was intended, sub silentio, to
forbid contractual limitations on attorneys' malpractice liability
because no state has any law regarding this subject except for
the rules of professional conduct themselves."
Major arguments against permitting attorneys to limit their
liability contractually center on the "fiduciary" relationship be-
tween attorney and client. One major problem with this argu-
ment, however, is that it fails to weigh carefully all the pros and
cons of malpractice liability limitations. The fiduciary analysis
starts from the premise that malpractice liability limitations are
for the benefit of attorneys and to the detriment of clients.
2 It
fails to consider adequately the benefits to clients that permitting
a greater range of freedom of contract might produce. In short,
it seems to be little more than a label to justify a predetermined
conclusion.
A better method for evaluating the desirability of exculpatory
contracts would be to determine whether permitting such agree-
ments maximizes economic efficiency. In other words, one might
ask whether resources would be allocated to produce greater
value with or without such contractual limitations. The economic
efficiency model is appropriate for several reasons. First, eco-
nomic efficiency analysis is particularly well suited to analyzing
the effect that people's choices have on one another. In view of
the impact that agreements permitting attorneys to limit their
malpractice liability will have on clients and on third parties,
economic efficiency seems to provide a useful analytical frame-
work. Second, the goal of allocating resources in an efficient
manner is a worthy objective which is promoted by economic
efficiency analysis. There are some issues, such as euthanasia,
for which norms other than promoting efficient allocation of
resources might be considered more important objectives. There-
fore, even though in such a case one might consider which
solutions promoted efficient allocation of resources, most people
would reject such a goal in favor of advancing more "moral"
'0 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.8(h).
" G. HAzARD, JR. & W. HODES, Ti LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL Rui s OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 169-70 (1985).
12 See CODE EC 6-6.
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considerations. In the instant situation, however, there seems
little reason to believe that the problem of whether to permit
attorneys to limit their malpractice liability poses such a moral
dilemma. Because most of the rules of professional responsibility
were not intended to promote morality, 13 it would be rather
anomalous to decide the instant question based on morality.
Finally, economic efficiency analysis does not preclude the con-
sideration of other competing normative values.
In this Article, the restrictive approach to malpractice liabil-
ity limitations taken by the Code and the Model Rules is ex-
amined from an economic perspective. The effect of relaxing
these limitations is discussed in terms of economic efficiency.
The possibility of minimizing direct and indirect costs associated
with a client's decision about entering into an exculpatory agree-
ment is explored, while ways to reduce the costs associated with
enforcing such an agreement are suggested. The various ration-
ales that courts have used for refusing to enforce exculpatory
agreements in other industries also are examined. The applica-
bility of these arguments to attorneys' attempts to limit their
malpractice liability contractually is considered. Finally, addi-
tional public policy objectives for refusing to permit attorneys
to limit their malpractice liability are analyzed.
I. ESTABLISHING A MODEL OF ECONOMC EFFCIENCY
One of the basic tenets of economic efficiency theory is that,
in the absence of transaction costs, agreements between parties
For example, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains restrictions
on attorney advertising and on nonlawyers practicing lav that were motivated in large
part by anti-competitive instincts of attorneys. See J. AUERBACHS, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 41-50 (1976); J. HURST, THE
GROWTH OF A mRCAN LAW 331 (1950). See generally Shuchman, Ethics and Legal
Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
244 (1968). The restrictions had very little to do with morality. Likewise, the Model
Rules adopt a rather tentative approach toward policing attorneys' ethics in negotiation.
This approach has been described by one commentator as motivated by a desire not to
permit the large number of attorneys who would be unwilling to abide by a more severe
restriction on negotiation ethics to take advantage of the clients of the ethical attorneys.
See White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 926. Once again, morality takes a backseat to practicality under
the Model Rules. Therefore, it seems rather hypocritical to argue that morality dictates
that limitations on malpractice liability should be prohibited by the ethics rules.
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will produce greater economic efficiency than existed before the
agreement.' 4 "In general, transaction costs include the costs of
identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs
of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process
itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached.' ' 5 When
transaction costs exist, third parties outside the agreement also
may incur costs (referred to herein as indirect costs). 16 Economic
efficiency is defined as exploiting economic resources in such a
way that value, as measured by consumers' willingness to pay
for goods and services, is maximized.'
7
In a monopolistic market, agreements between consumers
and a monopolist would not necessarily enhance economic effi-
ciency.' 8 The lack of competition among common carriers and
among public utilities may explain why courts in modem times
have refused to uphold exculpatory agreements in these indus-
tries.' 9 On the other hand, the market for attorneys is highly
4 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYis OF LAw 11-13 (3d ed. 1986). Following is
an illustration of the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency:
[ilf A values the wood carving at $5 and B at $12, so that at a sale price
of $10 (indeed at any price between $5 and $12) the transaction creates a
total benefit of $7 (at a price of $10, for example, A considers himself $5
better off and B considers himself $2 better off), then it is an efficient
transaction, provided that the harm (if any) done to third parties (minus
any benefit to them) does not exceed $7. The transaction would not be
Pareto superior unless A and B actually compensated the third parties for
any harm suffered by them. The Kaldor-Hicks concept is also and sugges-
tively called potential Pareto superiority: The winners could compensate
the losers, but need not (not always, anyway).
Id. at 11-12.
11 A. PouINsKy, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMCS 12 (1983).
16 See R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 12, 13 n.3.
" Id. at 12.
'S See id. at 249-60. In a world of zero transaction costs, absent real coercion,
agreements entered into with monopolists would be economically efficient because con-
sumers could get together costlessly to force monopolists to charge prices commensurate
with what would be charged in a competitive market. Essentially, monopolists would
not be able to command monopoly prices if there were no transaction costs. Because in
the real world, consumers cannot costlessly band together, a monopolistic market means
that voluntary agreements will not necessarily be economically efficient.
,9 See Note, Validity of an Ordinary Bailment Contract Limiting Liability of Bailee
for Negligence, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 772, 777 (1938). See also, e.g., Collins v. Virginia
Power & Elec. Co., 168 S.E. 500 (N.C. 1933); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Appel,
266 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1954); Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 256 P.2d 825 (Wash.
1953) (refusing to uphold exculpatory agreements in favor of public utilities); W. KEETON,
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competitive. 20 Therefore, absent other transaction costs, either
direct or indirect, permitting attorneys to limit their malpractice
liability prospectively by contract will more efficiently allocate
resources than will prohibiting such agreements.
In a world of zero transaction costs, allowing attorneys to
contract away their liability for negligence would add no cost to
clients in seeking good attorneys. At no cost, clients would be
able to discover from friends or from some other source the
records of attorneys before hiring them. They would also be
able to find out individual success rates, the malpractice claims
made against specific attorneys, informal complaints, and any
disciplinary proceedings instituted against the attorney. More-
over, because the cost of information to clients would be zero,
they could ask questions of as many attorneys as necessary to
achieve a clear understanding of the exculpatory agreement.
Finally, there would be no costs associated with determining
whether a client voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to
recover for any malpractice that might be committed by the
attorney. As a result, many clients would seek to bargain for
service at reduced cost in exchange for an agreement to limit
malpractice liability. Economic efficiency would be increased
over the current rule, in which attorneys' exculpatory agreements
are forbidden, because, in the absence of transaction costs,
voluntary agreements between parties are viewed as enhancing
economic efficiency.21
In the real world, however, transaction costs are not zero.
For example, prospective clients cannot discover cost-free the
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 482-
83 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 575(1) (1932).
[A] bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of negligence
is illegal if ... one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service,
and the bargain relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its
duty to the public, for which it has received or been promised compensa-
tion.
Id. For cases in which courts have refused to uphold exculpatory contracts in favor of
common carriers, see Caribbean Produce Exch., Inc. v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 415 F.
Supp. 88 (D.P.R. 1976); Varian Assoc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 149
Cal. Rptr. 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Girard v. Bankers Dispatch
Corp., 562 P.2d 32 (Kan. 1977).
:1 See Weil, Economically, It's Been a Decade of Running in Place, Nat'l L. J.,
Feb. 10, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
21 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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reputations of attorneys whom they might hire. Consequently,
decisions in selecting attorneys sometimes are made on the basis
of scanty information. 22 Moreover, there are costs associated
with adequately informing prospective clients of their rights to
refuse to limit their attorneys' malpractice liability. Clients may
agree to such limitations without fully understanding or appre-
ciating the consequences. Conversely, because of lack of infor-
mation, clients may refuse to agree to such limitations even
when it is in their economic interest to do so. Furthermore, there
are costs associated with determining whether there has been an
informed and voluntary waiver of these rights. There are also
costs to clients in ascertaining whether, in the absence of poten-
2 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 n.30 (1977) ("Information
as to the qualifications of lawyers is not available to many. .... And, if available, it
may be inaccurate [sic] or biased."); Spencer v. Supreme Court of Pa., 579 F. Supp.
880 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985) (prohibition against the use of
subjective terms in attorney advertising, such as "experienced," "expert," "highly
qualified" or "competent" which are misleading, is constitutional); AimRicAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SURvEY LEGAL NEEDS 21-25
(1978); C. WoLFRAM, supra note 2, at 906 ("Whatever ability an average citizen once
might have had to make an informed and wise choice of a lawyer based on community
reputation, clients in a modem, transient, urbanized community clearly lack any reliable
reputational basis for choosing a lawyer."). Cf. MODEL RuLEs, Rule 7.1 comment ("The
prohibition in paragraph (b) of statements that may create unjustified expectations would
ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as
the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts,
and advertisements containing client endorsements."). But cf. Ex Parte Howell, 487 So.
2d 848 (Ala. 1986) (Alabama's blanket ban on advertising of attorney specialization that
is not misleading or deceptive violates first amendment); In re Johnson, 341 N.W.2d
282 (Minn. 1983) (Minnesota Supreme Court Rule that prohibits attorneys from holding
themselves out as specialists until the Court adopts a rule for attorney specialization
held unconstitutional on its face and as applied to an attorney who held himself out as
a civil trial specialist certified by the National Board of Trial Advocacy); State ex rel.
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Schaffer, 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982) (attorney could not be
disciplined, consistent with the Constitution, for an ad in which he promised to provide
free legal service whenever his performance was not rendered expeditiously, even if the
ad is analogous to guaranteed performance of quality of work). See generally B.
CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERs FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 141 (1970) (arguing that
attorneys should not be subject to discipline for quality claims in advertising, and that
threat of civil liability is adequate deterrent to false claims in advertising); B. CURRAN,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PuaLIc: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURvEY 200-03
(1977) (52% selected lawyer based on recommendation of a friend or relative; 33% chose
lawyer who they had known personally).
For a discussion of the way in which corporate counsel select and evaluate outside
counsel, see M. ALTmAN & R. WEIL, How To MANAGE YOUR LAW OFFICE § 3.08, at 3-
26 to 3-33 (1985).
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tial malpractice liability, the attorneys they hire will have suffi-
cient incentive to avoid committing malpractice. The latter costs
may not be much different from the current costs of finding
good attorneys because clients will look for attorneys who will
do a good job without the clients having to bring malpractice
lawsuits.
In addition to the direct costs between the parties to an
agreement, there are indirect costs in permitting attorneys to
limit their malpractice liability. These costs are borne by poten-
tial clients who are not privy to the agreement between the
attorney and client. In particular, one must consider whether a
change in the rule prohibiting attorneys from limiting their mal-
practice liability would cause the public to reduce their use of
legal services to an economically inefficient level. In other words,
one must consider whether the public's perception of attorneys
would decline to such a degree that potential clients would avoid
using attorneys even though it would be economically efficient
for them to do so. Potential clients may face an increased cost
in selecting a good attorney because a decline in the number of
malpractice lawsuits is likely to reduce the supply of valuable
information about attorneys. Permitting attorneys to limit their
malpractice liability also may permit incompetent attorneys who
otherwise might have been forced out of business to continue in
practice. These problems are discussed together with suggestions
for ways of minimizing transaction costs.
In order to ascertain whether a rule that restricts or forbids
attorneys from prospectively limiting their malpractice liability
is more economically efficient than a rule that permits all such
agreements, one must look to the Coase Theorem. Under the
Coase Theorem, in the absence of transaction costs, the efficient
outcome will be produced by the parties' voluntary agreement
regardless of the choice of rule adopted. This is so because the
parties will be able to adjust their behavior without cost in
accordance with the rule of law in effect. When there are positive
transaction costs, the legal rule that minimizes transaction costs
1- See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
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will produce the more efficient outcome. 4 Thus, in the instant
situation, to determine which rule is more efficient, one must
compare costs of the kind discussed above to the costs created
by the current rule forbidding attorneys from limiting their
malpractice liability. One cost of the current rule is that it
precludes clients from contracting for a limitation on attorney's
malpractice liability at a reduced price. Some clients may prefer
to obtain legal services for a reduced fee in exchange for relin-
quishing their right to sue their attorney for malpractice. The
current rule precludes such agreements. It also results in attor-
neys spending an inordinate amount of time practicing defen-
sively in order to avoid potential malpractice claims.2 Ultimately,
a rule precluding attorneys from limiting their malpractice lia-
bility may produce increased legal fees because attorneys will
refuse to accept cases unless they are adequately compensated
both for their time and for the risk of being subject to mal-
practice liability.26 Furthermore, clients presently are forced to
bear the expense of enforcing a malpractice claim. Clients may
24 See id. at 15-16; A. POLISKY, supra note 15
We can now state the more complicated version of the Coase Theorem: If
there are positive transaction costs, the efficient outcome may not occur
under every legal rule. In these circumstances, the preferred legal rule is
the rule that minimizes the effects of transaction costs. These effects include
the actual incurring of transaction costs and the inefficient choices induced
by a desire to avoid transaction costs.
Id. at 13.
2 See Waldman, supra note 2, at 27, col. 3 ("[L]awyers are starting to practice
much more defensively .... The new precautions consume precious billing hours, and,
ultimately, clients pay for them."). Cf. Thompson, Malpractice: Doctors, Patients Pay
the Price: How Rising Insurance Premiums, Threat of Suits Have Changed American
Medicine, Wash. Post, July 24, 1985, (Health), at 7, col. I (as a result of malpractice
concerns, 31% of doctors are maintaining more detailed medical records; 20% are
ordering more diagnostic tests and performing more procedures; 17% have increased the
number of follow-up visits; and 17% spend more time with their patients).
2 This is not to say that in any given case the price of legal services will be a
direct measurement of the costs. It is true that, in the long run, absent transaction costs
and assuming a competitive market without entry or exit barriers, the price of services
offered by the marginal provider will equal the marginal cost of those services. See A.
POLINSKY, supra note 15, at 85-87. Thus, if the price exceeds marginal cost, more
providers will enter the market and drive the price down to the marginal cost. Likewise,
if the price is beneath the marginal cost, providers offering services at such a price vill
drop out of the market, thereby causing the price to return to the marginal cost. See
id. However, in any particular case, a provider of services will try to obtain the highest
price he can for those services, regardless of the cost of those services.
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believe that the time and expense of enforcing a malpractice
claim will exceed the value of the future right to that claim.
Similarly, clients who perceive the risk of losing a malpractice
suit as being too high might prefer to waive or to limit their
rights to any future claim in exchange for reduced legal fees.
If a rule allowing attorneys to limit their liability were in
effect, attorneys would have some incentive to agree to such
limitations if their clients sought them. Competitive pressure
might compel attorneys to seek to limit their liability. Moreover,
the prospect of avoiding the time and expense of malpractice
trials would be appealing to many attorneys. In addition, if the
overall cost of attorneys' services were reduced, an individual
attorney who was in no better competitive position as against
other attorneys might still profit. For example, reduced legal
fees generally might cause clients to make greater use of attor-
neys' services, thereby increasing the wealth of many attorneys.
II. APPLYING THE EcoNoMIc EFIINcY MODEL
A. Direct Costs of Permitting Limitations on Attorney
Malpractice Liability-Costs Incurred by the Client
The cost of negotiating the agreement is the first major
transaction cost connected with a system that would permit
attorneys to limit their malpractice liability. As a general rule,
allowing parties to negotiate their contracts freely will effectively
obviate the problem of negotiating expense because the parties
will engage in the process only if they determine that the cost
of negotiation is less than the cost of foregoing the agreement.
However, freedom of contract may not promote economic effi-
ciency if there are impacted information costs. Impacted infor-
mation costs arise when one of the parties to a contract is better
informed than the other, and the other cannot rely on the first
party to disclose candidly the needed information. 27 There may
be different reasons for the unwillingness to disclose. For ex-
27 See 0. WimmAsoN, MARKiTS AND HiERARcfl: ANALYSIS AND ANTrTRusT
IMPLiCATIoNS 14, 31 (1975). Information impactedness typically causes the less knowl-
edgeable party to consult outside sources, often at considerable cost, to achieve infor-
mation parity with the more knowledgeable party. Id. at 14.
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ample, the more knowledgeable party may wish to take advan-
tage of the other party's lack of information. Alternatively, the
information may not be conveyable at a reasonable cost. Partic-
ularly with respect to technical information, for which the less
knowledgeable party may need additional background, the cost
of conveying information may be prohibitive. Thus, an unso-
phisticated client might not fully appreciate the risk of relying
on the advice of the attorney he was seeking to retain concerning
the wisdom of entering into an exculpatory agreement. Under
the current rule precluding exculpatory agreements, clients do
not risk incurring costs associated with an incorrect decision
based on insufficient or misunderstood information. Obviously,
there is no opportunity to make this type of decision.
There may be ways, however, to minimize some of the
transaction costs connected with the negotiation of an exculpa-
tory agreement. Written agreements relieving attorneys from
liability will reduce the likelihood of an incorrect decision by a
client. A writing may reduce the chance of failure of commu-
nication between attorney and client in a much less costly way
than hiring an independent attorney to counsel the client on the
advisability of the agreement. 8 A writing also may decrease costs
associated with conflicting oral testimony.2 9 Finally, a writing
probably will cause some people to reflect before they enter into
a transaction. 0 Rather than being pressured to make a decision
on the spot on the basis of an attorney's highly charged argu-
ment, a writing may enable an individual to consider more
carefully the advisability of agreeing to an exculpatory clause.
If a writing alone does not protect the client sufficiently from
an overbearing attorney, a cooling-off period before the agree-
ment becomes effective might be a solution." For example, a
23 Hiring separate counsel is required by Model Rule 1.8(h) for an attorney to
limit his liability. However, it is not sufficient. Such an agreement must still be permitted
by state law. See supra text accompanying note 11.
2 See R. POSNaR, supra note 14, at 239 (cost of enforcing some oral promises
may be disproportionately high in relation to the gains).
J. CALAMARI & J. PERLLO, CONTRACTS § 19-1, at 673 (1970) (quoting Rabel,
The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 LAw Q. REv. 174, 178
(1947)).
" Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978); id. at 469
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("The circumstances in which appellant Ohralik initially
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client's agreement to limit his right to sue for malpractice would
not be effective unless executed 24 or 48 hours after he received
a written copy of the proposed agreement. Such a cooling-off
period might reduce the likelihood that an attorney could unduly
influence his client.
Enforcing an agreement to limit malpractice liability is an-
other major transaction cost. Attorneys might be reluctant to
offer their services at reduced fees in exchange for such an
agreement if they know the cost of enforcing such an agreement
is exorbitant. Using court-approved forms would reduce this
problem. 32 For example, in Miranda v. Arizona,33 the Supreme
Court prescribed fairly explicitly what statements had to be made
by the police to criminal suspects to insure that any confessions
obtained would be admissible into evidence in a subsequent
trial.34 The rule in Miranda relieved the police of having to guess
whether they had made adequate disclosure to the suspects.
Even after Miranda, however, courts still must determine
whether the suspect's waiver of his rights is knowing and vol-
untary.35 Presumably, this uncertainty would exist in the instant
situation as well. Again, a writing is one way to remove some
uncertainty without causing the client to incur the expense of
hiring separate counsel. But a writing should not be conclusive
as to the voluntary nature of an agreement. In short, a client
should still be able to avoid the effects of the agreement if he
can prove the traditional elements of undue influence. 6
approached his two clients provide classic examples of 'ambulance chasing'.... Ohralik,
an experienced lawyer in practice for over 25 years, approached two 18-year-old women
shortly after they had been in a traumatic car accident."); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
438 (1978) (A state may constitutionally prohibit "solicitation that in fact is misleading,
overbearing, or involves other features of deception or improper influence.").
12 Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 84 ("The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are
sufficient under the rules. . .
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'4 See id. at 478-79.
"' To secure admission into evidence of a confession over the defendant's objection,
the government has a heavy burden of proof that the defendant's waiver of his rights
was "made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." Id. at 444. Constitutionally, the
government is required only to prove the voluntariness of the confession by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). See W. LAFAvE &
J. ISRAEL, CRNAL PROCEDURE § 10.3(c), at 461 (1985).
?' See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981) which provides in part:
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B. Indirect Costs of Permitting Attorneys to Limit Their
Malpractice Liability: The Public Perception of Attorneys
Allowing attorneys to limit malpractice liability contractually
could impose a cost through the decline in public confidence in
(1) Undue influence is unfair persuasion of a party who is under the
domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of
the relation between them is justified in assuming that "that" person will
not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare.
(2) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by undue influence
by the other party, the contract is voidable by the victim.
See also 13 S. \WLISTON, WnLSTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1625-25A (W. Jaeger 3d ed.
1970).
An argument can be made that a statement signed by a client agreeing to limit an
attorney's liability should be treated in the same way that a criminal suspect's signed
waiver of his rights should be treated-as strong, though not conclusive, evidence that
it is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See United States v. Willis, 397 F.
Supp. 1078, 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing United States v. Blocker, 354 F. Supp. 1195
(D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). See also C. WHITrBREAD, CRumNAL
PROCEDURE § 15.05(d) (1980). Unlike the situation involving a confession, nothing in
the United States Constitution would prevent a client's signed statement from being
conclusive regarding whether the client had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
agreed to a limitation on an attorney's malpractice liability. The question remains as to
whether it would be economically efficient to treat the writing as a conclusive waiver of
the client's prerogative not to enter into a retainer agreement which limits the attorney's
malpractice liability.
Just as there are incentives for the policeman to overbear the will of a suspect,
there are incentives for the attorney to overbear the will of the client regarding execution
of the waiver. In fact, the attorney stands to benefit personally and directly from the
limitation on liability whereas the policeman may benefit only indirectly insofar as he
may receive a promotion based on meritorious service. The policeman, however, also
may receive some psychic benefit from doing what he believes to be a good job of
locking up criminals, whereas even the most greedy attorney would not get the same
thrill from victimizing his clients. The attorney likely would face a stiffer sanction if his
conduct is detected than would the policeman. However, the policeman's conduct is
more likely to be the subject of greater scrutiny (by defense counsel) than would the
attorney's conduct (by the appropriate disciplinary agency). This arises in part from the
fact that many uninformed clients who agree to limitations on malpractice liability Will
not realize that their agreement might be ineffective.
Even though an attorney may have greater incentive to overbear the will of a client
than a policeman, the inherently coercive nature of the custodial setting may put greater
pressure on the criminal suspect than a prospective client is subjected to. See 384 U.S.
at 467. Arguably, however, clients are not as suspicious of their prospective attorneys
as criminal suspects are of the police.
It can be argued that the public interest in favor of the admissibility of the
confession-with the potential result of removing a criminal from the streets-is greater
than the benefit (reduction of attorney's fees) produced by the agreement limiting the
attorney's liability. However, this analysis ignores the public interest in deterring viola-
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the profession which in turn could cause people to make inef-
ficient choices regarding their use of attorneys. This could occur
in either of two ways. First, clients who felt they were duped
into giving up their right to sue for malpractice might be reluc-
tant to use attorneys to handle their disputes in the future. This
would cause those individuals to seek alternative means of re-
solving disputes. The alternative they choose might be less eco-
nomically efficient for society than their hiring attorneys. For
example, persons with civil complaints might seek to resolve
their disputes by violence rather than by hiring lawyers. Fur-
thermore, some clients duped into exculpating their attorneys
from malpractice liability might become so disenchanted with
the profession after their attorney actually commits malpractice
that they would not consult another attorney regarding the va-
lidity of the exculpatory clause. This scenario, however, is un-
likely to occur very often because in many instances individuals
will have no real choice whether to retain an attorney. Moreover,
even if some individuals victimized by bad attorneys acquire an
unfavorable view of the legal profession, it may not be sufficient
to cause them to cut off their noses to spite their faces. Second,
there is the danger of misperception by third persons. By allow-
ing attorneys to contract away liability, some members of the
public may believe incorrectly that clients in general are being
duped by their lawyers. As a result, they might decide to avoid
using attorneys in situations where their use might enhance ef-
ficiency. The important question to be resolved, then, is whether
tions of the fourth amendment by the police.
Finally, it can be argued that the harm to the suspect who voluntarily relinquishes
his rights is much greater than the harm to the client who unknowingly or involuntarily
agrees to a limitation on an attorney's malpractice liability. This argument assumes that
individuals always will prefer to make monetary payments rather than spending time in
jail, which may not be true.
In sum, there is probably no reason to think that clients will enter more frequently
into inadvisable exculpatory clauses with their attorneys than criminal suspects will agree
inadvisedly to relinquishment of their rights. Furthermore, in both contexts the costs
attendant to failure to give great weight to the respective waivers would be high.
Consequently, one could argue that a similar standard of proof is justified. Of course,
a criminal suspect's rights are constitutionally mandated and in fact may not be eco-
nomically efficient. Therefore, even though there are good reasons for equating the
standard of proof for the client's written relinquishment of his right to sue his attorney
with the suspect's waiver of his rights, neither may prove to be economically efficient.
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a prophylactic rule totally eliminating exculpatory contracts does
more harm than good.3
7
The argument that exculpatory clauses should be forbidden
because of the dangers of tainting public perception of attorneys
fails. It is premised on an outdated, if not wholly inaccurate,
view of public opinion. For example, in contemporary urban
society, in which clients are not familiar with all the attorneys
in town or the nature or price of their services, clients need
attorney advertising much more than they did 100 or even 50
years ago. 38 Although there were dire predictions about the
impact of advertising on the public's perception of attorneys, 39
there has been no discernible decline in public opinion ° since
,,
37 In many instances, the cases decided under the current Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility have made clear that the value associated with the public's percep-
tion of the legal profession is not an absolute which must hold sway regardless of the
costs involved. For example, in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975), the defendant, Chrysler, moved to disqualify plaintiff's
counsel, Hammond & Schreiber, because Dale Schreiber of that firm had worked on
certain matters for Chrysler while an associate with the law firm of Kelley, Drye, et al.
The district court refused to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, and that decision was affirmed
by the Second Circuit. Id. at 753. The court of appeals noted that the appearance of
impropriety standard required under the Canon Nine of the Model Code should not
"override the delicate balance created by Canon Four and the decisions thereunder."
Id. at 757. The Second Circuit added that allowing individuals the counsel of their
choice was also relevant. Id. In short, the appearance of impropriety standard is not
considered in a vacuum. It is viewed in the context of the costs and benefits. To the
same effect, see MODEL RuLEs, Rule 1.10.
11 See B. CHEMSTENSEN, supra note 22, at 128-35; C. WoRPAm, supra note 2, at
906.
31 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977):
It is claimed that price advertising will bring about commercialization,
which will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth. The
hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the profession's service
orientation, and irreparably damage the delicate balance between the law-
yer's need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve. Advertising is also
said to erode the client's trust in his attorney: Once the client perceives
that the lawyer is motivated by profit, his confidence that the attorney is
acting out of a commitment to the client's welfare is jeopardized. And
advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the profession.
Id. at 368. See also C. WoLFRAm, supra note 2, at 778-80.
40 See Lawyer Advertising, 5 LAW. ALERT 22 (Oct. 14, 1985) (80% of people
surveyed believe advertising is a good way to learn about lawyers); Middleton, Ads Pay
Off-In Image and Income, Nat'l. L.J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 4, at 22, col. 1 ("[A]
previously unpublished ABA study indicates that the public is not put off by legal
advertising and that advertising can, in fact, help improve the image-and income-of
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the Supreme Court decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,41
which found unconstitutional certain restrictions on attorney
advertising. Likewise, changed public perceptions about the role
of the attorney and the best economic interest of the client may
prevent the public from viewing agreements which limit attor-
ney's malpractice liability with a jaundiced eye. 42 In short, the
public could be educated to the advantages of such agreements.
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that permitting attorneys
to limit their liability for malpractice would change public per-
ception of attorneys, it is entirely possible that the change might
be favorable. Clients may start paying closer attention to agree-
ments they enter into with attorneys. At present, some clients
spend an inadequate amount of time discussing what services
their attorneys will perform and the cost of those services. Al-
lowing attorneys to limit their liability by contract may help raise
client consciousness, thereby preventing clients from taking costs
for granted.
Consumers who routinely purchase goods or services gener-
ally have a good idea of whether it is cost efficient for them to
attempt to acquire more information about the costs of the
services provided. For example, a mother with young children
in a supermarket reasonably might determine that checking the
cash register to make sure she is not overcharged is not worth
her time and effort. She has learned from experience that the
automatic scanners generally are accurate, and her children are
more likely to damage some merchandise while she is watching
the cash register. A client, however, may seek legal services only
lawyers."). Cf. L. HAms, Confidence in Major Institutions Down, in Tim HARmus
SURVEY (Dec. 16, 1985) (The percentage of people expressing a great deal of confidence
in law firms has declined from 1407o in 1977 to 12076 in 1985, mirroring a similar decline
in confidence in other major American institutions. A copy of the Harris Survey is on
file with the author.). But cf. Cook, ABA Study Says Lawyers' Professionalism Has
Declined, Nat'l. L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 10, col. 1 (ABA study of clients and judges
found that they believe professionalism among lawyers has declined).
,' 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Cf. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise:
A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084, 1091-93 (1983) (supply
and demand for legal services are elastic and can be influenced by lawyer advertising);
The Packwood Bill, Wall St. J., May 6, 1986, at 26, col. I ("In the real world,
individual behavior is dynamic; it changes, unlike the static behavioral models that drive
economic policy making in Washington.").
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once or twice in a lifetime. For that reason, he might not realize
that the risk of harm due to ignorance, multiplied by the amount
of harm likely to result, exceeds the cost of inquiring about the
nature and price of the attorney's services. If allowing attorneys
to contract away liability succeeds in causing more consumers
to pay closer attention to the arrangements made, fewer fee
disputes may result.
43
Furthermore, the client may be less likely to assume that her
attorney is on top of the problem and may keep closer tabs on
the attorney. This may have the effect of improving the quality
of services offered. It also may result in fewer disputes between
the attorney and client because the client will have a better
understanding of what is happening in her case." As with the
mother in the supermarket, however, keeping closer tabs on the
attorney has its costs. 45 But if clients become more aware that
attorneys seek to protect their own interests as much as those
of their clients, then clients may be able to make more informed
decisions as to whether it is worth keeping closer tabs on the
services being performed.
Finally, the subjective nature of public perception of impro-
priety makes it a very shaky foundation on which to support a
prohibition of exculpatory agreements.46 The Supreme Court in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel47 held that Ohio
41 See, e.g., AamRicAN BAR AssOcIATION, PREVENTING LEGAL MALRACTiCE 4, 7
(1978); T. BROWN, III, How TO AVOID BEING SUED BY YOUR CLIENT: PREVENTIONS AND
CURES FOR LEGAL MALPRACTCE 35-40 (1981); D. STERN, AVOIDING LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIms 11-14 (1982).
" See generally Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 919, 1008-09 (disputes between attorneys and clients are
often the product of the "vagueness and nonmutuality of the legal service contract").
41 See Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Bentham-
ite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 373 (1976) ("A major
problem ... lies in determining whether consumers perceive the marginal benefits of
possessing more information ... to be greater than the marginal social costs, including
law-making and enforcement costs, entailed in providing it.").
6 Cf. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir.
1979) ("[v]hen there is no claim that the trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety
is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest
cases."). See generally Gross, Ethical Problems of Law First Associates, 26 vM. &
MARY L. REV. 259, 278 n.88 (1985) ("Although many if not most courts that have
considered the issue have refused to disqualify an attorney on the sole basis of Canon
Nine and the appearance of impropriety, a few courts have done just that.").
- 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), which restricts advertising by attor-
neys, could not be justified on the basis that some members of
the public might find it offensive or embarrassing.4 The Court
stated:
[A]Ithough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in
ensuring that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in
the courtroom, we are unsure that the State's desire that at-
torneys maintain their dignity in their communications with
the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the
abridgment of their First Amendment rights. Even if that were
the case, we are unpersuaded that undignified behavior would
tend to recur so often as to warrant a prophylactic rule....
IT]he mere possibility that some members of the population
might find advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify
suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that
some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity.
49
The same argument applies in the present context. First, even
assuming that some attorneys would attempt to limit liability so
as to make it difficult for their clients to understand their
seeming loss of rights, this may not occur often enough to
require a prophylactic rule. Many attorneys would be deterred
from such behavior by concerns that the agreements would not
be effective in limiting their liability or by the possibility that
disciplinary proceedings would be brought against them. Second,
even if some members of the public view liability limitations as
inherently "improper," if they have suffered no harm personally
as a result of the arrangement, it would be economically ineffi-
cient to permit them to prevent clients who are not perturbed
by this arrangement from entering into such contracts.50
41 Id. at 648.
11 Id. at 647-48.
" Interestingly, members of the public who have the most unfavorable impression
of attorneys seem to be those that have never used attorneys. See B. CURRAN, supra
note 22, at 234-37, 264 (Those who have never consulted an attorney were more likely
to be concerned about the value of attorneys' services in relation to the cost and to be
skeptical about attorneys' interest in them and their problems. Multiple users of attorneys
were more likely to be positive about the value of lawyers' services, while being somewhat
critical of their work habits); AmERcAN BAR AssocIATMO, Tan LAwYER'S HANDBOOK
A2-14 (citing THE MissouRi BAR, Mssotnu BAR Pn mca HA. SuRvEY, A MOTIVA-
TIONAl. STUDY OF PUBLIc ATrrruoDEs AND LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT 37 (1963)).
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Thus, allowing attorneys to limit their malpractice liability
contractually may not cause a significant change in public per-
ception of attorneys. Even if it did, the question remains whether
it would alter the behavior of the public regarding their use of
attorneys' services. Arguably, any change in the attorney/client
relationship resulting from a relaxation of the prohibition might
be beneficial if it caused clients to keep a more watchful eye on
their attorneys.
C. Additional Indirect Costs of Permitting Limitations on
Attorney Malpractice Liability
If attorneys are permitted ethically to limit their liability,
there is a danger that some will commit more acts of malpractice
because they will no longer be deterred by malpractice lawsuits.
However, assuming that the agreement between attorney and
client is optimal from an efficiency standpoint, we need not be
concerned about loss to the client. What is of concern, however,
is that other potential clients would no longer receive the possible
benefits flowing from a malpractice suit which might have been
brought against the attorney. In other words, permitting attor-
neys to limit or avoid malpractice liability may cause members
of the public to be deprived of information concerning those
attorneys. That loss may be costly, depending on whether the
lost information is misleading.
Under a rule which precludes attorneys from limiting their
malpractice liability, a few neglectful attorneys might be forced
out of business by malpractice lawsuits. Still others would have
their reputations affected by the malpractice lawsuit, causing
fewer people to employ these attorneys unless adequate discounts
were given. In a system that permits attorneys to avoid mal-
practice lawsuits, the information flowing to other potential
clients concerning the negligent attorney is curtailed. Of course,
disciplinary action could be taken against an attorney who ne-
glects his cases. 51 However, at present many disciplinary com-
5' See DR 6-101(A)(3); Annotation, Negligence, Inattentions or Professional In-
competence of Attorney in Handling Client's Affairs as Grounds For Disciplinary Action,
96 A.L.R.2D 823 (1964). For the purpose of determining compliance with the Code of
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mittees do not view cases of attorney negligence as subject to
discipline unless gross negligence is involved.52
Relying on disciplinary proceedings to fill an information
void, left when malpractice claims are barred by exculpatory
clauses, is troublesome for other reasons. In particular, discipli-
nary proceedings generally are not as economically efficient as
civil actions. First, disciplinary boards usually will not proceed
against an attorney until a complaint has been filed.5 3 In large
part, this is due to the vast number of complaints filed and the
limited resources available to most disciplinary agencies.54 This
problem is exacerbated by the unwillingness of many attorneys
to file a complaint against a fellow member of the bar. 5 Second,
many disciplinary boards are composed of attorneys who have
no special interest in seeing others in the profession disciplined.16
Professional Responsibility, the ABA defines neglect as follows:
Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the
obligations which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious
disregard for the responsibility owed to the client. The concept of ordinary
negligence is different. Neglect usually involves more than a single act or
omission. Neglect cannot be found if the acts or omissions complained of
were inadvertent or the result of an error of judgment made in good faith.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1273 (1973). See also
Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 88, 107 & n.123 (1976-77).
51 See G. HAZARD, JR. & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PRoFEssIoN: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATON 425 (1985); Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is
It Self-Regulation, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 216 ("Most agencies do not treat neglect or
other negligence as within their jurisdiction, unless it is gross negligence.").
A M RicAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITEE ON EVALUATION OF DIsCIPLI-
NARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DIsCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT-
FINAL DRAn, 60-61 (1970) [hereinafter CLARK ComMrrrEE REPORT], reprinted in part in
G. HAZARD, JR. & D. RHODE, supra note 52, at 425-30; Marks & Cathcart, supra note
52, at 206.
4 See CLARK CO MINE REPORT, supra note 53; C. WoLFRAM, supra note 2, at
100; Cook, supra note 40, at 10, cols. 2-3.
" See Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689, 717 (1981).
See Arkin, Self-Regulation and Approaches to Maintaining Standards of Profes-
sional Integrity, 30 U. Mtnta L. REv. 803 (1976); Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public
Participation in Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1978); Jost,
The Public's Stake in Lawyer Discipline, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 8, 1985, at 2, col. 5. See
also Kaberon, ABA Study Released: ABA Panel's Evaluation, Chi. Daily L. Bull., May
20, 1985, at 11, col 6 (recommending that the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disci-
plinary Commission change its rule, which excludes members of the public from its
hearing boards, so that non-lawyers comprise one-third of the hearing and review board
members). Recently there has been a trend toward greater public participation in the
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This is particularly true in states where board members serve
without compensation and where the few paid assistants are
interested in maintaining, not maximizing, their workloads. In
certain instances, attorneys paid for work on disciplinary boards
may have some interest in increasing their workload in order to
justify their positions or to allow them to press the legislature
for more funding of their agency. On the other hand, in states
short of funds, paid assistants on disciplinary boards may see
any attempt to enlarge their empires as futile. Therefore, they
have no incentive to do more work than the minimum required.
Moreover, attorneys can exert pressure on disciplinary boards
by lobbying state legislatures to limit funding for disciplinary
panels .57
Third, many members of the public will not file disciplinary
complaints against attorneys because there is no economic incen-
tive for them to do so.1 Some may, through their attorneys, file
disciplinary complaints in conjunction with civil lawsuits against
their former attorneys in an effort to coerce favorable settle-
disciplinary process. See C. WoLFRAM, supra note 2, at 46, 84 ("Traditionally, bar
discipline has been the exclusive province of judge and lawyers. The 1979 ABA Disci-
plinary Standards recommended, however, that a third of the members of hearing panels
in discipline cases be nonlawyers. The concept has been adopted in a large number of
states."). The most recent survey responses compiled by the ABA show 22 jurisdictions
(including the District of Columbia) with public representation on disciplinary boards
and grievance committees. In addition, the 10th Judicial District in New York and the
district covering Cleveland, Ohio provide for representation by members of the public.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON PRoFEssIoNAL Discn'w, AND THE AmElmcAN BAR AssocliAnoN
CENTER FOR PRofessIoNAL REsPoNsIBIITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER Disc'mUNE SYSTEMs
Chart VI (Oct. 1985) [hereinafter SURvEY ON LAWYERs Discnpun SYSTEMs]. The ABA
has evaluated the disciplinary systems in 11 of those states. Interestingly, it found that
"lawyer members of the boards are more likely to find misconduct and to vote for a
stronger sanction than non-lawyer members." McPike & Harrison, The True Story of
Lawyer Discipline, 70 A.B.A. J. 92, 92 (Sept. 1984). See generally Belgrad, Public
Participation in Lawyer Matters-A Statement of Confidence, M.D. B.J., Winter 1979,
at 32 (arguing in favor of public participation in the disciplinary process).
" Cf. AMERICAN JUDIcATuRE SocIETY, WORKSHOP: OFF-TnE-BENcH CONDUCT OF
JUDGES, 74-79 (1985) (attempts to limit funding to the Michigan Judicial Tenure Com-
mission because of its actions in disciplining a judge).
Funding for disciplinary board has increased since the Clark Committee Report of
1970 stated that " 'lack of adequate financing is the most universal and significant
problem in disciplinary enforcement.' " McPike & Harrison, supra note 56, at 94. In
1984, disciplinary agency budgets for all states totalled over $30 million. See SURVEY ON
LAWYER DISCIPMLN SYsTEMs, supra note 56, Chart III.
18 See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 44, at 946-64.
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ments. Such conduct by the new attorneys, however, would likely
be viewed as a violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A) of the
Code. 9 For these reasons, attorneys in general perceive the threat
of discipline from state disciplinary agencies as insubstantial. As
a result, voluntary compliance with the standards of professional
conduct has been rather indifferent in many quarters.
60
Finally, disciplinary proceedings generally will not serve to
inform the public about the ethically questionable behavior of
many attorneys because the initial proceedings, and sometimes
even the actual discipline imposed, are kept confidential. 61 In
" See CODE DR 7-105(A) ("A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting,
or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.").
See also id. at EC 7-21. DR 7-105(A) has been interpreted by at least one court to apply
to threats to charge an attorney with unethical conduct. In re Madsen, 370 N.E.2d 199,
200 (I11. 1977) (A lawyer, who was subject to discipline, violated DR 7-105(A) by
threatening former associates that if they testified against him, "he would submit
evidence that their conduct had been unethical, that they were guilty, 'on a civil basis,'
of contractual violations and of violations of the Criminal Code."). See also Kentucky
Ethics Opinion E-265 (1983) (attorney may not seek to gain an unfair advantage in a
civil lawsuit by threatening to file a disciplinary complaint when the lawyer believes
another lawyer has a conflict of interest), cited in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) § 801:3907 (1984). Cf. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Gebhart, 431 N.E.2d 1031 (Ohio
1982) (frivolous threat that attorney would seek to have another attorney disbarred
constituted violation of DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2) in that the purpose of the threat was to
harass or maliciously injure the other attorney); In re Ellsworth, 486 A.2d 1250 (N.J.
1985) (having client sign a release exempting attorney from ethical charges and attempts
to compromise ethical charges constituted violations of DR 6-102(A)).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have no provision comparable to DR 7-
105. See T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, 1986 SELEcTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONA.
REsPoNsmrry 180. However, such a threat in some jurisdictions might constitute
criminal extortion and thereby cause the attorney to run afoul of Model Rule 8.4(b),
which makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that
reflects upon his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law. See C. WOLFaM,
supra note 2, at 718.
- See Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 953, 958. Enforcement has been weakest in the areas of greatest concern for clients:
inattention, incompetence, delay, mishandling of client property, and fee abuses. See
Gross, supra note 46, at 269 n.49 ("[A] large proportion of client complaints center on
neglect and fee disputes. But fee disputes and cases of neglect or other negligence rarely
result in either suspension or disbarment."); Marks & Cathcart, supra note 52, at 216.
1' See Jost, supra note 56. See also, e.g., Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior
Court, 354 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1960); In re Klein, 166 N.Y.S.2d 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957);
McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 348 A.2d 376, 381 (Pa. 1975) ("[a]ll
proceedings involving allegations of misconduct by ... an attorney shall be kept con-
fidential until and unless the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court enters its order for the
imposition of public discipline or the respondent-attorney requests that the matter be
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sum, under the current system, permitting attorneys to avoid
malpractice liability contractually would deprive potential clients
of much valuable information concerning attorneys who were
able to obtain exculpatory agreements. Hence, compared to a
system in which information about attorneys could be made
more readily accessible, the current system would not deter
malpractice adequately if exculpatory agreements were permit-
ted.
If there existed other deterrents to attorney malpractice to
protect potential clients adequately, the loss of information re-
sulting from permitting attorneys to limit their malpractice lia-
bility contractually would not be so troubling. Although the
attorney could be deprived, in whole or in part, of compensation
for his services because of his negligence or breach of fiduciary
duty,62 this mild deterrent is inadequate, at least by itself, for
two reasons. First, the client may not detect the attorney mal-
practice. 63 Second, even if detected, the client already may have
paid a sufficiently large retainer to cover the attorney's time.
Hence, instead of being able to assert the attorney's malpractice
as a defense to the attorney's claim for fees, the onus will be
on the client to initiate the lawsuit. Having already been burned
by one attorney and faced with the prospect of a relatively
modest recovery, the client may be unwilling to trust another
attorney with a legal malpractice claim. 64 Even in those states in
which the client can obtain arbitration of a fee dispute, the
public or the investigation is predicated upon a conviction of the respondent-attorney
for a crime. .. ").
62 See, e.g., Slade v. Harris, 135 A. 570, 572 (Conn. 1927); Joseph Land & Co.
v. Green, 486 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass.
574, 578 (Mass. 1878); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982). See also R.
MALiEN & V. LEvir, LEoAL MALPRACTICE § 9 (2d ed. 1981).
63 Cf. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. Ray. 1, 25-26 (1982) (suggesting that punitive damage awards are appropriate when
the probability of liability, for example, in cases of fraud or oppression-is less than
the probability of loss).
61 Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 556. However, clients' unwillingness to sue their
attorneys, as well as the reluctance of lawyers to participate in lawsuits against other
lawyers may be disappearing quickly. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 27, col. 3 ("[Ihe
bar isn't immune to the menacing liability suits that lawyers have pressed so successfully
against members of other professions .... ).
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confidentiality of the proceeding generally shields the attorney's
conduct from public scrutiny.
65
Permitting attorneys to exculpate themselves from malprac-
tice liability without making other changes in the current system
will result in a loss of valuable information to potential clients.
Although the costs of this loss of information are difficult to
quantify, they may be higher than the costs created by the rule
precluding attorneys from contractually limiting their malprac-
tice liability. Rather than rejecting the proposed change out of
hand, however, we must determine whether other changes in the
current system would adequately compensate the public with
protection from unethical and incompetent attorneys.
III. LMITNG THE COSTS OF LiAiLrrY CLAUSES: MANDATING
DISCLOSURE
A system which permits attorneys to limit their malpractice
liability contractually while simultaneously increasing consumer
access to information about the quality of legal services might
well be more economically efficient than the current system.
Potential clients currently have a great deal of difficulty discov-
ering information regarding the quality of legal services. Con-
sequently, many attorneys are not overly concerned about loss
of business because of adverse publicity or word of mouth from
dissatisfied customers.
As discussed above, the investigatory phase of attorney dis-
ciplinary proceedings generally is kept confidential. Often, even
the discipline imposed is kept confidential. One step toward
increasing consumer knowledge about unethical attorneys would
be to make this information more readily accessible to the public.
If all such complaints were made public, however, an attorney's
practice could be seriously impaired by frivolous charges, leaving
him with very little recourse. One solution, which is followed by
about one-third of the disciplinary agencies, makes disciplinary
'1 See Devine, Mandatory Arbitration of Attorney-Client Fee Disputes: A Concept
Whose Time Has Come, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1205, 1236 (1983) ("Most fee arbitration
procedures are designed to ensure confidentiality. Thus, aside from the exception which
allows disclosure of the amount of the award, the records of the arbitration committee
usually are protected."). See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 556-58.
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proceedings public only upon the filing and service of formal
charges against an attorney.66 Professor Martyn has noted that
this solution may be fair to individual attorneys insofar as it
guarantees their privacy until official action is taken. Such a
guarantee of privacy, however, "prevents public scrutiny of the
vast majority of complaints received." 67 In support of Professor
66 See AimtmucAN BAR AssocITION, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DIscPLINE AND Dis-
ABILITY PROCEEDINGS Standard 8.25 (1983), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA,
1986 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PRol ssIONAL REsPONsiBmrrY ("Upon the filing and
service of formal charges the proceeding should be public, except for: (a) deliberations
of the hearing committee, board or court; and (b) information with respect to which
the hearing committee has issued a protective order." The commentary to Standard 8.25
states: "Once a finding of probable cause has been made, there is no longer a danger
that the allegations against the respondent are frivolous."). As of Spring, 1983, 16 states
had adopted Standard 8.25 (These states are Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.). AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CEN-
TER FOR PRoFEssIONAL RiSPoNsmTrrY, SURVEY OF LAWYER DISCIPINARY PROCEDURES
IN TM UNITED STATES Part I, at 22 (1984). See generally Annotation, Restricting Access
to Records of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys, 83 A.L.R.3d 749 (1978).
Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline:Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEo.
L.J. 705, 737 (1981) (footnote omitted). Professor Martyn explains as follows:
Publicity, however, is essential to the deterrence potential of the
disciplinary process. Publicity educates both lawyers and the public and
enables them more reasonably to evaluate their own expectations of the
attorney-client relationship. Despite this benefit, the Standards for Disci-
pline continue the tradition of barring publicity until a client complaint
has been fully investigated and formal charges have been prepared by the
agency.
Id. at 737 (footnotes omitted).
Most jurisdictions continue to place a tight lid on attorney disciplinary proceedings.
Thus, most jurisdictions dispose of the bulk of their complaints without a formal hearing.
Furthermore, there is generally no publicity when the sanction is a private reprimand.
See id. Of late, there has been a trend toward opening up the attorney disciplinary
process. For example, "Connecticut state judges and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
have changed [their] rules in order to increase public access to the grievance process."
Connecticut, California, Maine Rethink Discipline Procedures, 2 [CURRENT REPORTS]
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 78, 78 (Mar. 19, 1986); Discipline Goes
Public in Washington, IDAHO BAR L., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 22. See also Egelko, State Bar
Discipline Under Fire, CAL. LAw., June, 1986, at 55-56; Smith, Open Disciplinary
Hearings: Where Are All The People?, TBE WESTERN LAW JOURNAL, Winter 1983, at 9
(open disciplinary hearings have given the process added credibility even though hearings
have been sparsely attended).
Professor Gillers has argued in support of making the facts and commission rulings
public in all attorney disciplinary cases, even though the names of the attorneys and the
identifying details remain secret. This procedure will educate attorneys as to what is
expected of them; it will enable attorneys appearing before disciplinary commissions to
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Martyn's position, one might cite Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona,61 wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that
prohibiting advertising "assumes that the public is not sophisti-
cated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that
the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct
but incomplete information .... [W]e view as dubious any
justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.
'69
The same argument could be raised with respect to maintaining
the confidentiality of disciplinary complaints against attorneys.
It appears that the principal basis for both the rule prohibit-
ing attorney advertising and the rule maintaining the confiden-
tiality, at least temporarily, of complaints against attorneys was
to protect the public from making incorrect decisions based on
erroneous information. In holding the blanket ban on advertising
to be unconstitutional, the Court in Bates was operating on the
belief that preventing the dissemination of such information
would be more damaging to the public than permitting its re-
lease, even though some of the information might be mislead-
ing. 70 The same argument can be made with respect to the rule
maintaining the confidentiality of disciplinary complaints. On
the other hand, however, public misconceptions created by at-
torney advertising may be easier to correct than those created
by client complaints. For example, persons who see an attorney's
advertisement may very well try to learn additional information
about the attorney. Persons who discover complaints lodged
against an attorney may not take the time to learn anything
further about that attorney. However, at least at the point at
which the disciplinary agency decides that formal charges should
be brought against the attorney, the informational value of the
complaint is probably much greater than that of the self-serving
advertisement of the attorney.
argue for a sanction commensurate with that given in another case; and it will enable
the bar and the public to monitor the work of disciplinary commissions. Gilers, 5 Ways
to Improve Laityer Discipline in New York, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1986, at 1, col. 3, at 28,
col. 2. See also Murphy, Restructuring Is Proposed for Disciplinary System, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 15, 1986, at 29, col. 5.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 374-75.
See id. at 372-75.
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An additional concern about making public all client com-
plaints against attorneys is whether the complainant should con-
tinue to be relatively insulated from civil liability. Currently,
individuals filing disciplinary complaints against attorneys re-
ceive some form of immunity from civil liability.Y The immunity
protects the public from unethical attorneys by encouraging per-
sons to be more forthcoming With complaints. 72 Because attor-
neys have little recourse by way of either a defamation or
malicious prosecution action against a complainant, they need
some measure of confidentiality to protect themselves from un-
founded complaints.7 3 On balance, allowing disciplinary com-
plaints to become public only upon the disciplinary body's filing
of formal charges against attorneys may well be more econom-
71 Actions for malicious prosecutions, although recognized in theory, are very
difficult to prove. See Annotation, Malicious Prosecution or Similar Tort Action Pred-
icated Upon Disciplinary Proceedings Against an Attorney, 52 A.L.R.2d 1217, 1219
(1957). Moreover, some jurisdictions have conferred blanket immunity from malicious
prosecution actions on complainants who filed disciplinary complaints against attorneys.
See, e.g., Netterville v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Miss. 1981); Toft v.
Ketchum, 113 A.2d 671 (N.J.), aff'd on rehearing, 114 A.2d 863 (N.J.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 887 (1955). Most recent cases have conferred absolute immunity from defa-
mation actions on complainants filing charges against attorneys provided that the charge
has some relationship to the proceeding. See, e.g., Drummond v. Stahl, 618 P.2d 616
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981); Mueller v. The Florida Bar,
390 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Wong v. Schorr, 466 P.2d 441 (Hiaw. 1970);
Kerpelman v. Bricker, 329 A.2d 423 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Sinnett v. Albert, 195
N.W.2d 506 (Neb. 1972); Wiener v. Weintraub, 239 N.E.2d 540, (N.Y. 1968); Ramstead
v. Morgan, 347 P.2d 594 (Or. 1959). Compare Conley v. Southern Import Sales, 382 F.
Supp. 121, 124-25 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (qualified immunity); Allen v. Ali, 435 N.E.2d 167
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (court found a qualified immunity for letters sent to bar associations
not having jurisdiction over attorney discipline; however, if the letter had been sent to
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, it would have been subject to an
absolute privilege); McChesney v. Firedoor Corp. of Am., 361 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1976) (qualified immunity).
347 P.2d at 596. See REsTATEiMN (SEcoND) oF TORTS Introductory Note,
Chapter 25, Title B, at 243 (1977); Note, Liability of Bar Associations for Libel During
Disbarment Investigations, 23 IowA L. REv. 83, 87-88 (1938).
73 Cf. Madda v. Reliance Ins. Co., 368 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1l. App. Ct. 1977)
(because attorneys have power to control confidentiality of investigatory phase of dis-
ciplinary proceeding, attorney could not maintain action for malicious prosecution
because he could not show special injury); McAfee v. Feller, 452 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970) (absolute privilege from defamation accorded individual who filed
complaint against attorney with grievance committee; privilege premised on fact that
there was no repetition or republication of the charges).
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ically efficient than keeping clients' complaints permanently con-
fidential or making them public as soon as they are lodged.
There are, however, other ways in which public awareness
about the competence, diligence, and ethics of attorneys could
be increased without unduly damaging blameless attorneys. For
example, at present, potential clients have difficulty obtaining
access to information regarding attorneys who have had formal
disciplinary charges brought against them. Likewise, there is no
easy way for potential clients to discover whether attorneys have
had any malpractice claims brought against them and, if so, the
results of such claims. Consumer access to such information
could be increased if a central registry, such as a bar association,
kept records of formal disciplinary complaints and malpractice
suits along with the actions' outcomes. Such an office would
operate much like a better business bureau.74
This proposed solution, however, is not foolproof. If attor-
neys were able to completely avoid malpractice liability by con-
tract, fewer malpractice actions would be reported to the registry
because fewer malpractice complaints would be filed. 75 Perhaps,
then, setting a dollar ceiling on an attorney's malpractice liability
would be preferable to permitting complete exculpation.76 There
would still be some incentive for individuals to bring malpractice
claims, and potential clients could still receive the benefit of the
victimized client's knowledge concerning the malpracticing at-
torney.
Attempting to maximize the number of malpractice claims
reported to the central registry would present a challenge. At-
torneys would have a tremendous incentive to agree to malprac-
tice claims settlements containing a proviso that clients not divulge
1' See California Senate Bill No. 1569 (July 24, 1986) (to be codified at CAL. Bus.
& PROF. ch. 475) (discussed in 2 [CURRENT REPORTS] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 284 (Aug. 6, 1986)). Cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1985, § B, at 17, col. 1
(lawyers' group provides information regarding malpractice suits against individual doc-
tors for $5 per inquiry).
- Even if more individuals personally filed complaints with the appropriate disci-
plinary agency because they no longer had the outlet of a malpractice action, there
would still be fewer complaints than under a system in which dollar limitations on
attorney malpractice liability were permitted, although complete exculpation was forbid-
den, and malpractice complaints and/or judgments and settlements were routinely trans-
mitted to the bar association by the clerk of the court, for example.
I', See RE TATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 195, comment a (1981).
1987]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the terms of the settlement to the registry. This problem could
be mitigated by requiring that all malpractice carriers who make
any payments on malpractice claims report those payments to
the central registry." Attorneys, however, might try to conceal
claims by making payments out of their own pockets. At least
one court has suggested that a similar attempt to conceal mal-
practice was ethically improper and might constitute a basis for
disciplineY.7  Even if the attorney's misconduct is not discovered
by the disciplinary agency, the prospect of having to pay mal-
practice claims out of one's own pocket may well be a sufficient
deterrent to cause the attorney to exercise an appropriate degree
of care.
Another alternative is to require the court clerk to report all
complaints alleging attorney malpractice to the central registry.
This approach would likely increase the number of claims re-
ported, although an attorney would still be tempted to avoid
having the clerk report the claim by settling with the client prior
to the filing of the complaint. This suggested alternative, how-
ever, presents the risk that the client who has not really been
victimized by malpractice will try, in effect, to blackmail the
attorney with the threat of a complaint to the registry.
79
In sum, to one degree or another, disciplinary proceedings,
the threat of lost fees, and competition provide some deterrent
to attorney malpractice. At present, however, they cannot fll
the information void which would be caused by allowing attor-
neys to completely avoid malpractice liability through exculpa-
tory agreements. Permitting exculpatory agreements which limit
Cf. IrL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, 1 4437, § 16.04(3) (Smith-Hurd 1986) (requiring
malpractice insurance carriers to report the settlement of medical malpractice claims).
71 Mitchell v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1279 (1973).
But see R. MALLEN & V. Larr, supra note 62, § 434, at 494 ("Notwithstanding moral
considerations, however, it does not appear that any civil or ethical standard compels
such disclosure in the abstract.").
" Cf. R. PosNER, supra note 14, at 117-19 (suggesting that to require specific
performance for all breaches of contract would expose breaching parties to the threat
of blackmail from nonbreaching parties who had suffered no serious damage from the
breach. Requiring specific performance for all breaches of contract also would have the
effect of eliminating many economically efficient breaches of contract). Compare Schwartz,
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 274-78 (1979) (stating that specific
performance is the best method of compensation).
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but do not extinguish liability is one solution. Taking steps to
assure that more information concerning attorneys' records is
made available to consumers is another possible solution.
IV. RATIONALES FOR REFUSING TO ENFORCE EXCULPATORY
CLAUSES: Do THEY MAKE SENSE FROM AN ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY PERSPECTIVE?
Many courts have refused to sustain the validity of excul-
patory agreements in favor of common carriers, 80 innkeepers,"
employers, 2 telegraph companies, 3 professional bailees5 4 hos-
I See T. COOLEY, A TRn.4TIsE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 721-28 (1907). At common
law, a common carrier could limit its liability by contract only to the extent that the
contract did not exempt the carrier from liability for its own or its servant's negligence.
York Co. v. Central R.R., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 107 (1865); Southern Express Co. v.
Hunnicutt, 54 Miss. 566 (Miss. 1877); Hance v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 56 Mo. App. 476
(Mo. 1893); Dillard Bros. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 70 Tenn. (2 Lea) 288 (Tenn. 1879).
But see Louisville & N.R. v. Sherrod, 4 So. 29 (Ala. 1888) (contractual stipulation
limiting carrier's damage in exchange for reduced transportation charge upheld when no
undue advantage taken of shipper, even though goods destroyed by carelessness of
carrier's servants). Accord Duntley v. Boston & Maine R.R., 20 A. 327 (N.H. 1890);
Zimmer v. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R., 16 N.Y.S. 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1891),
aff'd, 33 N.E. 642 (N.Y. 1893).
1' Oklahoma City Hotel Corp. v. Levine, 116 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1941); Maxwell
Operating Co. v. Harper, 200 S.W. 515 (Tenn. 1918). Today, most jurisdictions, by
statute, permit innkeepers to limit their liability provided that there is strict compliance
with the statutory provisions requiring notice to guests. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
71, I (Smith-Hurd 1986) (innkeeper not liable for guest's personal property provided
he makes a safe available to guest and posts notice of same and guest deposits property,
unless the innkeeper or his agents are negligent and, even then, damage limited to $250
unless special agreement between innkeeper and guest); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200
(Consol. 1987) (innkeeper not liable for guest's personal property provided he makes a
safe available to guest and posts notice of same and guest deposits property, but no
obligation on innkeeper to put property in safe exceeding $1,500 in value unless special
agreement between innkeeper and guest); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4721.01 (Anderson
1977). See also J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 25.09, at 638 (1982).
12 Gatheright v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 267 So. 2d 576 (La. Ct. App.
1972); Johnston v. Fargo, 77 N.E. 388 (N.Y. 1906); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran,
102 N.Y.S.2d 65 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d 882 (1951); Pittsburgh
C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 506, 508 (Ohio 1916); Direct Transp. Co.
v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co., 121 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Gravitt, 551 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
1 Early cases permitted telegraph companies to avoid liability if they gave the
customer the option of sending a message at a higher price. See, e.g., Primrose v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894). See also M. BiGELow, ELEMENTS OF TH
LAW OF TORTS 305-06 (5th ed. 1894); J. DOOLEY, supra note 81, at 728-30. However,
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pitals, health care professionals,"5 and others. The six rationales
most frequently given by these courts for invalidating a contrac-
tual provision relieving a party of liablity for his own negligence86
are: (1) that negligence will be encouraged or at least not dis-
couraged sufficiently if exculpation is permitted;87 (2) that the
meaning of the agreement was not made clear enough to the
potential plaintiff to enable him or a person in his position to
understand it;8 (3) that the party seeking to enforce the excul-
patory.clause occupied a clearly superior bargaining position;89
(4) that the clause was offered on a take-it or leave-it basis;90
(5) that enforcement of the agreement would violate public pol-
icy;91 and (6) that the party seeking exculpation was licensed by
more recent decisions applying common law have held such exculpatory clauses to be
void. Id. at 638, 639, n.3. The Interstate Commerce Act permits a limitation of liability
for unrepeated interstate messages 49 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (1982).
14 See J. DOOLEY, supra note 81, at 636-37; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON &
D. OwEN, supra note 19, at 483, nn.31-32; Note, supra note 19.
11 See, e.g., Tunki v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444-46 (Cal. 1963);
1 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AmERicAN LAW OF TORTS § 5:39, at 1093-94
(1983).
" Almost all courts have held that a party cannot contract away liability for
intentional torts, wanton or willful misconduct, or gross negligence. See 1 S. SPEISER,
C. KRAuSE & A. GANS, supra note 85, § 5.39, at 1098 n.52; REsrATEImINT (SEcECO) OF
CornAcRs § 195(1) (1981).
17 See Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., Inc., 453 So. 2d 735, 737-38 (Ala. 1984);
Fidelity Bank v. Tiernan, 375 A.2d 1320, 1327 (Pa. 1977). But see Abel Holding Co. v.
American Dist. Tel. Co., 350 A.2d 292, 301 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aff'd,
371 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
11 See, e.g., Poslosky v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. 1961);
Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979); 1 SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra
note 85, § 5.39, at 1288-89; 15 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CoNTrACTs § 1751, at 151
n.6 (3d ed. 1972).
89 See, e.g., 383 P.2d at 444-46; Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 444 S.W.2d
78 (Ky. 1969); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977). See also, Note, The
Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law of Exculpation, 37 CoLUM.
L. REv. 248 (1937).
1o See Schlobohm v. SPA Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 924-25 (Minn. 1982);
Obstetrics and Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985). See also Ponder v.
Blue Cross of S. Cal., 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 636-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (for exculpatory
clause in adhesion contract to be valid it must be precise; the exclusion must be
conspicuous; and the language of the exclusion must be plain and clear).
11 See Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, 383 P.2d at 447-48, 225 Cal. Rptr.
757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest, 114 N.E.2d 721,
725-26 (Ill. 1953). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(b) (1981) provides in
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the state and held himself out as an expert in the area. 92 For the
reasons set forth below in the examination of each rationale,
only (1) and (2) have any support at all on an economic effi-
ciency basis.
As previously discussed, the question of whether giving effect
to exculpatory agreements will sufficiently deter attorneys from
committing malpractice is vital to an economic efficiency anal-
ysis. It should not be presumed, however, that more deterrence
always increases economic efficiency. Clients who agree to a
contractual limitation on the attorney's malpractice liability have
decided implicitly that the attorney is subject to sufficient deter-
rence (from disciplinary agencies, from the possibility of loss of
fees, from competition, or from other sources) that any added
deterrence provided by malpractice liability is unnecessary. Per-
mitting attorneys to limit their liability contractually may not
produce any change in public perception.93 Moreover, any change
may have more positive than negative effects. 94 Furthermore,
insofar as permitting attorneys to limit their malpractice liability
could result in a reduced flow of valuable information to poten-
tial clients, increasing public access to information about attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings and malpractice complaints would
more than offset the loss.
One might counter on behalf of the public interest that
weakening the deterrence to malpractice may be facilitating the
establishment of "bad" precedents. Attorneys who commit mal-
practice during an appeal of a case could create precedent that
will be "bad" law. As a result, clients will have to spend more
on attorneys' fees to change the law or devise less efficient
contractual means to circumvent the "bad" law. This potential
cost is remote, however, because only a very small percentage
pertinent part as follows:
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused
negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if...
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from
liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of
that duty...
,2 See, e.g., 558 S.W.2d at 430, 432.
" See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
' See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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of the malpractice committed by attorneys occurs during the
appellate process. 95 Moreover, a weak oral argument or brief
may not necessarily affect the outcome of the case.96 In addition,
a few erroneous appellate decisions may not prove costly to
nonparties because the precedent may be distinguished or over-
ruled in later cases. In short, the added deterrent effect provided
by a rule which precludes attorneys from contractually limiting
their malpractice liability is not necessarily "better" for the
clients or for the public generally.
The fact that the meaning of an exculpatory agreement is
not made clear to a potential plaintiff is a serious problem which
would cause most courts to refuse to enforce such an agreement.
It cannot be presumed, however, that all attorneys will fail to
inform their clients adequately or that the clients will be incap-
able of understanding the consequences of such an agreement.
A blanket prohibition on all attorney exculpatory clauses might
make sense from an economic efficiency perspective only if the
costs in preventing clients from being duped exceed the benefits
produced by freedom of contract. The previous analysis suggests,
however, that a blanket prohibition on all attorney exculpatory
agreements might not be necessary to protect the ignorant client.
The third basic rationale for refusing to enforce exculpatory
agreements is that the party seeking to enforce the exculpatory
clause occupies a clearly superior bargaining position. If by
"superior bargaining position" we mean that one party has more
information about the risks and benefits concerning the trans-
action than the other, there is cause for concern. Such a position
could affect economic efficiency, as impacted information costs
can cause parties to agree to transactions which are economically
inefficient. A court interested in economic efficiency might sub-
ject a transaction involving unequal access to information to
more intensive scrutiny in order to determine whether both par-
91 See Gates, Lawyers' Malpractice: Some Recent Data About A Growing Problem,
37 MERCER L. REv. 559, 561 (1986) (2.6% of the malpractice claims against attorneys
arise from appellate work).
9See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 762 (1983); Justices' Minds Made Up Long
Before Arguments, S. Illinoisan, May 18, 1986, at 32, col. 2, reprinted from Associated
Press, May 17, 1986, available on NEXIS (speech by Justice O'Connor stating that
Supreme Court Justices' minds generally are made up by the time they hear oral
argument).
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ties knew and understood the contract provisions. 97 For example,
courts often refuse to enforce "fine print" clauses in contracts
because of lack of knowledge by one party concerning the terms
of the agreement. 98 We cannot presume, however, that the at-
torney always has greater knowledge than the client99 or that the
knowledge differential cannot be equalized at a cost less than
that imposed by denying freedom of contract.
If, by "superior bargaining position," we simply mean that
one person, because of his economic position, can drive a harder
bargain than the other, economic efficiency does not preclude
enforcement of an exculpatory agreement. As explained above,
in a competitive market, assuming no transaction costs, 100 agree-
ments between parties will increase economic efficiency. Because
transaction costs are not zero, it is necessary to determine whether
the costs connected with limiting malpractice liability, reduced
to the extent possible, are greater than the costs imposed by the
Ethics Rules, which effectively prohibit attorneys from contract-
ing away their malpractice liability.10 1 This determination is un-
affected by whether the attorney or the client occupies a superior
bargaining position. The economic efficiency model is premised
on the assumption that there is no known change in the manner
in which wealth and income are distributed that will produce
greater economic efficiency. 10 2 Conceivably, the "superior eco-
nomic position" rationale for declining to enforce exculpatory
" See, e.g., Anton v. Greyhound Van Lines, Inc., 591 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1978);
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 19, at 483-84; Note, supra
note 89.
Whether in fact efficiency is enhanced by courts subjecting to greater scrutiny
transactions when one party has "superior bargaining position" is an open question.
The answer requires a comparison of the court costs, the costs attributable to incorrect
decisions and the transaction costs created by court decisions with the current costs
attributable to impacted information.
See I S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900 (3d ed. 1957).
See Kane, Kane & Kritzer, Inc. v. Altagen, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (Cal. App. 1980),
discussed infra in text accompanying note 124.
11" Transaction costs include the costs "of identifying the parties with whom one
has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining
process itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached." When there are trans-
action costs, third parties may also incur indirect costs. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text.
'' See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
See R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 13.
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agreements simply represents a refusal to accept this underlying
assumption. This assumption is explored in Part IV. B. below.103
Likewise, the fact that an exculpatory clause is offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis does not justify refusing to enforce it.
This may simply be an indication that, in the judgment of the
service provider, the cost of individually bargaining for excul-
patory clauses is too high relative to the possible benefits that
might be derived for the few clients who prefer them. As long
as the market is competitive so that a client can secure a different
exculpatory clause from a different attorney, or no exculpatory
clause at all, there are no negative effects (except the cost of
shopping for an attorney who will provide an agreement satis-
factory to the cient).0 4 If concern exists that a lack of compe-
tition among attorneys would cause all attorneys to offer their
services with malpractice liability limitations, attorneys could be
compelled statutorily to offer clients a choice of services with or
without a limitation of malpractice liability. Furthermore, the
differential between those fees could be fixed in relation to the
amount of malpractice insurance premium that the attorney pays
in order to buy protection from the prospective client's mal-
practice claim.
Many courts deny effect to exculpatory contracts on the
grounds that they are "contrary to public policy." 105 This ra-
tionale is question-begging at best, as what is in the public's
interest is far from clear.'t 6 In addition, the inquiry should not
end simply because the party seeking exculpation is licensed by
the state. Implicit in the argument that state licensure should
preclude contractual exculpation is the assumption that occupa-
tions licensed by the state are vital to the public interest. There-
fore, the argument goes, permitting exculpation from liability
must necessarily be damaging to the public interest. If public
interest is equated with economic efficiency, for the reasons
discussed in this Article, this conclusion would seem erroneous.
It could be argued, however, that public policy goals other
than economic efficiency may be served by forbidding certain
103 See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
104 See Trebilcock, supra note 45, at 363-65.
101 See supra note 91.
'0 See Note, supra note 89, at 248-29.
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classes of persons from exculpating themselves from liability for
negligence. There are two principal "public policy" arguments
against exculpatory contracts. The first is premised on a desire
to "spread the risk" of attorney malpractice among all potential
clients who have to pay increased malpractice insurance premi-
ums. This will prevent any individual client from being damaged
too heavily by his attorney's malpractice. The second argument
relies on the erroneous premise that preventing attorneys and
clients from entering into exculpatory agreements results in a
net transfer of wealth from attorneys to clients, which is viewed
as a positive social good. From an economic perspective, neither
argument justifies a rule prohibiting an attorney from limiting
his malpractice liability.
A. Spreading The Risk of Attorney Malpractice
It would be reasonable to assume that both clients and
attorneys as a group are risk averse when it comes to bearing
the large risk of loss attributable to attorney malpractice. More
specifically, most clients and most attorneys would prefer to pay
an insurance premium which exceeds the product of the risk of
a malpractice judgment and the amount of the expected judg-
ment. For example, if in any given case the risk of malpractice
is 1076 and the expected malpractice judgment is $100,000, most
clients and attorneys would pay more than $100,000 x 107o, or
$1,000, to avoid suffering that loss.
Moreover, attorneys as a group may be able to bear this risk
more cheaply than clients as a group. Attorneys are better po-
sitioned to measure accurately the likelihood as well as the
magnitude of loss. They are, therefore, in a better position to
know how much insurance to purchase. Furthermore, when in-
surance is purchased by attorneys, it is risk specific. Insurance
purchased by clients is likely to cover a wide range of risks.
Thus, even assuming that such a policy were available, a client
might be forced to purchase an omnibus liability policy to insure
against attorney malpractice. As a result, clients as a group will
be less able to take cost efficient steps to avoid the risk of loss
occasioned by malpractice. This assumes, of course, that insur-
ance companies could be pressured into adjusting their premiums
based on reductions in attorneys' malpractice exposure for those
1987]
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clients willing to agree to liability limitations. Finally, because
of administrative cost efficiencies gained in handling numerous
cases, attorneys are likely to pay lower insurance premium rates
than clients for identical coverage on a per capita basis.1 7
Assuming most clients would prefer to have their attorney
subject to malpractice liability in exchange for their payment of
their allocable share of the attorney's malpractice premium,
particularly as attorneys can more cheaply insure than clients,
the risk of loss for attorney malpractice should be borne by the
attorney, absent an agreement to the contrary.108 However, many
clients might not perceive the benefit attributable to increased
deterrence of attorney malpractice to be worth the added cost
in legal fees. Furthermore, many clients might prefer paying no
insurance at all to paying a premium (albeit a smaller one than
they would have to pay for self-coverage) through increased
attorney fees in order to insure against malpractice.109 The clients
who would be most willing to have their attorneys limit their
malpractice liability are those who have longstanding relation-
ships with attorneys in which they have confidence. For example,
large corporations employing outside counsel might have an
incentive to agree to such malpractice liability limitations. They
would be best able to investigate cost-effectively whether they
were well served by having their attorneys subject to the added
deterrence of malpractice liability. Moreover, in instances in
which the potential malpractice liability is large, the client po-
tentially may save more if he does not have to pay a large
malpractice insurance liability fee.
On the other hand, one can envision a situation in which a
rule precluding exculpatory clauses might be more efficient than
a rule permitting freedom of contract. If virtually no client was
107 See Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YAIE L.J. 1231, 1236
(1984).
103 When many people want a consumer contract containing similar terms, the use
of a standard form contract reduces the transaction costs connected with individually
negotiating and drafting the contract. See R. PosWaR, supra note 14, at 102. See also
supra text accompanying note 32.
119 Cf. Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA.
L. REv. 1053, 1056-59 (1977) (suggesting that a poor person, because he has less to lose,
for example, through lost wages, may be more -illing than a rich person to forego the
insurance a warranty provides).
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interested in allowing his attorney to limit his malpractice liabil-
ity, a rule permitting attorneys to do so would be counterpro-
ductive. In such a scenario, the transaction costs, including those
associated with misunderstanding of risks and removal of infor-
mation blockages to potential clients, could exceed the benefits
of freedom of contract. It seems, however, that a sufficient
number of people, if aware of the risks, would be willing to
take advantage of a discount in legal fees in exchange for liability
limitations. Offering a range of choices between comprehensive
liability for all errors and exemption from any errors would
increase the likelihood of finding a large enough pool of poten-
tial clients to make the system economically efficient. For ex-
ample, clients might prefer to continue to have attorneys liable
for outrageous mistakes that the clients would have no way of
preventing, such as failure to file claims within the applicable
statute of limitations. On the other hand, clients might willingly
waive malpractice liability against certain risks, particularly those
in which they would be unlikely to recover anyway. For example,
clients might be willing to waive liability for attorney errors in
trial tactics, such as failure to call a particular witness. Conceiv-
ably, agreements to waive potential attorney liability for such
"errors" would not have an appreciable effect on malpractice
premiums because the insurance carrier probably would not have
been liable anyway. However, the cost of defense, which has
consumed an increasingly larger portion of liability insurance
premiums,110 would be saved.
Evidence consistent with the thesis that an ample number of
people would be willing to contract away certain risks of mal-
practice liability is provided by the way in which clients purchase
legal services. Even though clients may perceive that some firms,
such as specialty law firms, provide a higher quality of service,
- The report of the experiences of American Home Assurance Company during
the period 1969-78 shows that the expenses of defending the claims constituted 43.7%
of the total amount paid by the company on lawyers' professional liability claims. See
Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional Liability Claims: The Search
for Facts, 1980 A). B. FoUND. REs. J. 253, 274 (figure obtained by dividing expenses
paid by sum of paid claims and expenses). Cf. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WoRKING
GROUP, supra note 1, at 42 ("out of every dollar paid out by the asbestos manufacturers
and their insurers as a result of asbestos litigation, 62 cents on the [a]verage is lost
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses .... ).
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many still choose to purchase mediocre legal services at reduced
prices. Assuming 100 is the maximum level of service attainable,
the Ethics Codes permit clients to purchase levels of attorney
services in a range of, for example, 60 to 100. Although a level
of "55" might be considered malpractice, arguably, clients should
be permitted to purchase legal services if they are aware of the
risk of malpractice and the lack of recourse by way of a law-
suit."' Underlying the fact that the Ethics Codes permit con-
sumers to contract freely for attorneys' services at vastly different
prices based on differences in quality of services provided even
though relevant information regarding quality of attorney Service
is often very scanty,1 2 there is an implicit assumption that there
are enough potential clients who can make informed judgments
regarding the quality of legal services. Logically, we can assume
also that a sufficient number of potential clients would be willing
and able to make informed decisions regarding the wisdom of
agreeing in advance to a limitation of attorney malpractice lia-
bility.
B. Prohibition of Malpractice Liability Limitations as a Form
of Wealth Transfer
Conceivably, a redistribution of wealth through prohibiting
contractual limitations of liability might serve to increase eco-
nomic efficiency. This would be true if the beneficiaries of such
a redistribution place a higher value on the property than the
people from whom the property was obtained. Apart from con-
sideration of efficiency, the redistribution of wealth may achieve
some "equitable" result desired by society. If either efficiency
or equity can be achieved by such a redistribution and if the
"I See Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-
Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wvis. L. R-v. 639, 660-
673; McChesney and Muris, The Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Legal Services,
65 A.B.A. J. 1503, 1504 (1979). See also Rosenthal, Evaluating the Competence of
Lawyers, 11 LAW & Soc. REv. 257, 263-64 (Special 1976) (quoting D. RosENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN CHARGE 59 (1974)) (In 77% of the cases surveyed (all
personal injury actions), "clients did worse than they should have according to the
arithmetic mean of the values assigned to their claims by each of the five [expert]
panelists." Clients fared worse than expected, yet it appears that in the vast majority of
the cases, no error was significant enough to constitute malpractice.).
112 See supra note 22.
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cost of redistributing wealth in this manner is less than the cost
of redistributing wealth through some other vehicle (for example,
taxation), then an ethical limitation on attorneys' avoidance of
malpractice liability may have some justification.
The first question to be addressed in this analysis is whether
a redistribution of wealth from attorneys to clients will take
place at all as a result of the ethical limitations on attorneys'
avoidance of malpractice liability. It seems unlikely that such a
redistribution will take place. Unlike cases in which attorneys
are appointed by courts to represent clients without a fee,113 a
client paying an attorney who cannot limit his malpractice lia-
bility is unlikely to be getting something for nothing. The attor-
ney will not willingly accept a risk of malpractice liability unless
he is compensated adequately. Thus, the attorney is likely to
charge his client a higher fee for accepting a risk of malpractice
liability than he would if there were no such risk. 114 Alternatively,
the attorney may simply be less willing to take cases in which
he perceives the risk of a malpractice claim as high."5
"' Compare State v. Richardson, 631 P.2d 221 (Kan. 1981), and In re Hunoval,
247 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. 1977) (attorneys can be appointed to serve as counsel without fee
in criminal cases), and Ex Parte Dibble, 310 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983) (attorneys
can be appointed to serve as counsel without fee in civil cases) with State ex rel. Scott
v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) (court lacks inherent power to appoint
attorneys to serve without fee in civil cases). See generally Shapiro, The Enigma of the
Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735 (1980); Note, Court Appointment of
Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 366 (1981); Note, Courts-No Inherent Power to Compel Uncompen-
sated Representation in Civil Cases-State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 37 MERCER L. Rnv.
873 (1986).
114 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
"' See Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 495 (1857). This phenomenon
exists in the medical community where doctors now are less inclined to specialize in high
risk areas such as obstetrics because large malpractice judgments have so increased the
cost of malpractice insurance premiums. See Hospital to Drop Obstetrics Unit, S.
Illinoisan, Feb. 21, 1986, at 9, col. 4. See generally AmEtcA MEDicAL ASSOCIATION
SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL Linrry AND INSURANCE, PRoFEssIoNAL LtAIrTrY
IN THE 80's, REI'ORT # I, at 3 (Nov. 1984).
Liability rules in other areas have had similar effects. For example, in many states,
lessors cannot limit their liability to lessees by lease provisions. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 80, 91 (1985); N.Y. GEN. OBa. LAw § 5-321 (Consol. 1978). If rent controls are
imposed to prevent landlords from passing on the cost of their inability to limit their
liability, a few tenants in the short run might benefit, but housing stock as a whole
would deteriorate. Thus, individuals would be less willing to invest in rental housing
under these conditions. See R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 445-48.
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If some attorneys, in order to increase their clientele in the
face of competition from their colleagues, refrain from passing
along the full cost of malpractice insurance to their clients, then,
to a limited degree, there may be some wealth transfer from
those attorneys, or from those with whom they are competing,
to their clients. It is far from clear, however, what purpose is
served by such a redistribution. Attorneys are not uniformly
wealthier than the clients they represent. Therefore, a Robin
Hood-like transfer could be achieved more effectively by taxa-
tion than by prohibiting contractual limitations of liability.
Moreover, taxation would probably effect redistribution more
cheaply as well. 1 6 Finally, the absurdity of preventing attorneys
from limiting their malpractice liability in order to promote
wealth transference is underscored by the fact that attorneys are
often clients." 7 Wealth transference from attorneys to clients is
not possible if attorneys can be on either side of the transfer.
Even if preventing attorneys from limiting their malpractice
liability may effect a transfer of wealth, economic efficiency is
not necessarily promoted. Clients as a class may not employ
their incremental gain in wealth to any greater utility than at-
torneys."' Assuming, arguendo, that transferring wealth from
116 See A. Polinsky, supra note 15, at 110-13.
117 "He that is his own lawyer has a fool for a client." THE FACTS ON FaEa
DICTiONARY 104:41 (R. Fergusson ed. 1983).
" Judge Posner has argued that it cannot be assumed that transferring wealth
from rich to poor will result in a net increase in economic efficiency. To the contrary,
he suggests that it is plausible "that income and the marginal utility thereof are positively
correlated-that the people who work hard to make money and succeed in making it
are on an average those who value money the most, having given up other things such
as leisure to get it." R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 434-36. Compare Baker, Utility and
Rights: Two Justifications for State Action Increasing Equality, 84 YAX L.J. 39, 40-48
(1974). ("[P]eople have a declining marginal utility for wealth. People place a higher
value on their first dollar than their second, on their second dollar than on their third.
A poor man would thus value an extra dollar more than would a rich man. .. ."
(footnote omitted)). For an interesting nontechnical discussion of the pros and cons of
income redistribution, see INEQuALrrY AND POVERTY 1-49 (E. Budd ed. 1967). Poverty
imposes some costs on the nonpoor (for example, crime). See Ehrlich, Participation in
Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in, ESSAYS IN rm EcoNoMcs OF CRUM
AND PUNISHMENT 68, 94 (G. Becker & W. Landers eds. 1974) (positive correlation of
commission of crimes against property with criminals' families earning less than one-
half of the median income). Thus, an individual living in poverty may steal, believing
that his marginal gains exceed his marginal costs. Id. at 111-12. Even if preventing
attorneys from limiting their malpractice liability did result in a wealth transferrence to
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attorneys to clients produced a net gain in economic efficiency,
a greater gain would be produced by means-tested transfers that
could be accomplished by taxing everyone rather than only at-
torneys. In summary, either from an economic efficiency or
from an "equitable" perspective, none of the so-called public
policy rationales in favor of precluding exculpatory clauses is
entirely persuasive as applied to agreements limiting attorneys'
malpractice liability.
V. THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP-A CONTRACT
MODEL
As discussed above, for a variety of reasons and in many
areas, courts have refused to permit individuals the full measure
of freedom of contract, specifically regarding agreements to limit
liability. On the other hand, in certain contexts, some courts
have considered clients fully capable of dealing with their counsel
on an arm's length basis. For example, the courts of Georgia
follow the "read-or-perish" rule where a competent client who
reads and signs a document that is not ambiguous or laced with
legal jargon will be unable to maintain successfully a malpractice
claim if the document does not fulfill the client's desires.' 19 This
rule is premised on a contract rather than a fiduciary model. By
holding that the client's claim does not perish if the legal doc-
ument is ambiguous or full of legal jargon, the Georgia courts
are, in effect, striving to reduce the transaction costs associated
with impacted information.
One exception to the "read-or-perish" rule, however, in-
volves a situation in which the client has relied on the attorney's
clients as a class, there is little reason to believe that such a transferrence would make
the recipient less likely to commit a crime.
"+ See Berman v. Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
[,Vhere the document requires substantive or procedural knowledge, is
ambiguous, or is of uncertain application, the attorney may well be liable
for negligence, notwithstanding the fact that his client read what was
drafted. [However,] ... when the document's meaning is plain, obvious,
and requires no legal explanation, and the client is well educated, laboring
under no disability, and has the opportunity to read what he signed, no
action for professional malpractice based on counsel's alleged misrepresen-
tation of the document will lie.
Id. at 806.
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advice for a length of time and therefore has no reason to read
the particular document in question.' 20 This exception would
probably not be relevant to the limitation of attorney liability
situation because the client has little reason to rely unquestion-
ingly on the attorney at the time of the initial retainer. 121 More-
over, a client might perceive the inherent conflict of interest in
an agreement drafted by an attorney who is a party. The client,
therefore, would be likely to read such an agreement more
carefully than he would an agreement drafted by his attorney
between himself and a third person. '22
120 See McWhorter, Ltd. v. Irvin, 267 S.E.2d 630 (Ga: Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
271 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1980).
121 There is authority for the proposition that the attorney-client fiduciary relation-
ship commences when "the attorney is consulted and renders advice or receives the
confidences of a client," but not before. D. HoaN & G. SPEILMIRE, JR., ATrORNEY
MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 12-4 (1986). See DeVaux v. American Home
Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983); In re McGlothlen, 663 P.2d 1330,
1334 (Wash. 1983). The client's perception that an attorney-client relationship exists is
also relevant in determining whether such a relationship exists. See In re Lieber, 442
A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982); Note, Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to
Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV. 751, 759
(1979).
If a client tells an attorney his story, and the attorney decides not to take the case,
the attorney would still have a duty of confidentiality with respect to the information
acquired. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); King v. King, 367 N.E.2d 1358 (111. App. Ct. 1977).
See R. MAumxN & V. LEvrr, supra note 62, § 123, at 216.
'2 Of course, in all cases an attorney will look after his own interest to the extent
that he wants to retain the client and avoid a malpractice suit or a disciplinary action.
In sharp contrast to the virtual ban-on attorneys contractually limiting their mal-
practice liability in advance of representing the client are the positions of the Model
Rules and many cases decided under the Model Code with regard to attorneys settling
malpractice claims with clients after the malpractice has taken place. One would think
that there would be greater concern when attorneys settle malpractice cases with their
clients. The client has come to rely on the attorney certainly more than he would at the
time the attorney was initially retained. Cf. In re Drake, 642 P.2d 296, 301-02 (Or.
1982) (en banc) (suggesting that the formal conclusion of representation often does not
end an attorney's influence over a client). Moreover, the malpractice already has been
committed. For these reasons, the conflict between attorney and client is more pro-
nounced at that point than it is at the initial retainer stage. Nevertheless, Model Rule
1.8(h) and many of the cases decided under DR 6-102(A) permit releases of malpractice
claims to be entered into between an attorney and a client provided that the client is
advised of the nature of the document and of his right to seek independent counsel
before executing the release. MODEL RULEs Rule 1.8(h). See The Florida Bar v. Nemec,
390 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1980); In re Tallon, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); In
re Goldberg, 442 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). See also New York State Bar
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Further support for a contract model can be found in those
cases that permit an attorney to avoid malpractice liability when
the scope of his duties has been narrowly defined by prior
agreement with the cient. 123 For example, in Kane, Kane &
Kritzer, Inc. v. Altagen, 124 an attorney was employed regularly
by the plaintiff to handle collection matters. The plaintiff was
a sophisticated businessman with more knowledge "than the
typical layperson with regard to legal matters." 125 The court held
that the scope of the attorney's duties did not impose upon him
an obligation to file a complaint before he was instructed to do
so nor an obligation to notify the client of the necessity of filing
a complaint before being so instructed. Therefore, the attorney
was not liable for malpractice when the client's claim was barred
by the statute of limitations. As in Kane, when a client has
sufficient information regarding the scope of representation
sought, courts have respected contractual limitations on the scope
of an attorney's duties. For similar reasons, a rule permitting
contractual limitations on the depth of an attorney's duties may
make sense.
Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 275 (1972), reprinted in 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 201 (1973).
But see The Florida Bar v. Leopold, 320 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1975) (release which was not
a general release and executed by client after client received advice of independent
counsel was still held to violate DR 6-102 (A)).
On the other hand, many of the reported decisions under DR 6-102 have involved
post-malpractice attempts by attorneys to obtain releases from clients through improper
coercion. The attorneys uniformly have been disciplined for such conduct. See, e.g.,
People v. Good, 576 P.2d 1020 (Col. 1978) (en banc); In re Darby, 426 N.E.2d 683,
684 (Ind. 1981); In re Judd, 682 P.2d 302 (Utah 1984). See also In re Craven, 390
N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 1979); C. WouRm, supra note 2, at 238-39 & n.57.
- See Johnson v. Jones, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (Idaho 1982) (attorney retained to
draft contract did not commit malpractice by failing to advise plaintiffs of their right
to receive certain assets in transaction and of the need to inventory certain corporate
assets which were supposed to have been conveyed to the plaintiff); Schmidt v. Hinshaw,
394 N.E.2d 559, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282,
1285 (Nev. 1984) ("[Elven with regard to a particular transaction or dispute, an attorney
may be specifically employed in a limited capacity."); Cleveland v. Cromwell, 112 N.Y.S.
643 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908). See also MODEL RutLs Rule 1.2(c) ("[A] lawyer may limit
the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation."); R. MALLEN
& V. LEvrT, supra note 62, § 101, at 175; C. WoLFR.m, supra note 2, at 212 & n.71;
Kaplan, Professional Competence: How to Measure It, What to Do About It, 63 A.B.A.
J. 1645, 1649 (1977).
114 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (Cal. App. 1980).
I" Id. at 537.
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In sum, a "fiduciary" model has not been employed in the
read-or-perish cases, which relieve an attorney from malpractice
liability when the client should have realized from reading the
drafted documents that his wishes were not being executed.
Likewise, a "contract" rather than a "fiduciary" model has
been used in relieving attorneys from malpractice liability cov-
ering matters beyond the scope of their agreements. By the same
logic, there is no inherent reason for rejecting out of hand a
"contract" model for limiting an attorney's malpractice liability
where the contract is entered into before the attorney begins
representing the client. The contract model may prove efficient
if the transaction costs normally associated with negotiating and
enforcing an agreement limiting an attorney's malpractice liabil-
ity can be reduced.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether attorneys should be permitted to
limit their malpractice liability contractually demands more than
simply characterizing the attorney-client relationship as "fidu-
ciary" and then responding in the negative. Likewise, the aphor-
ism that limiting attorneys' malpractice liability violates public
policy merely begs the question of what policy is being imple-
mented. A more fruitful method of inquiry involves determina-
tion of whether such a limitation would be economically efficient.
To make that determination, one must consider the direct costs
to clients and attorneys of negotiating and enforcing such agree-
ments. One must also consider the risk that some clients may
agree to a limitation on attorneys' malpractice liability without
realizing the full consequences of such an agreement. This would
produce an increased volume of litigation by former clients
seeking to avoid the effects of such an agreement. In addition,
one must consider whether and how permitting attorneys to limit
their malpractice liability could affect the public's perception of
attorneys. Finally, one must consider how permitting attorneys
to limit their malpractice liability may reduce consumer access
to valuable information concerning attorneys and the quality of
legal services offered.
In this writer's opinion, there are sufficient ways to minimize
the costs associated with negotiating, drafting, and enforcing
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agreements to limit attorneys' malpractice liability so that a
contractual limitation (though perhaps not complete exculpation)
on attorneys' malpractice liability should be permitted. Even if
the costs of permitting attorneys to limit their malpractice lia-
bility are ultimately determined to exceed the benefits produced
by greater freedom of contract, the focus on economic efficiency
may produce some positive results. Thus, the inquiry may enable
us to find ways to increase access to information about mal-
practice claims and complaints against attorneys without unduly
harming competent and ethical attorneys.
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' Whether it would be more efficient to have such information transmitted to the
public by the government or by private enterprise is an open question.
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